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Abstract
University

: The American University in Cairo

Thesis Title

: Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: The need for proper financial and
administrative controls

Name

: Ahmed Fathy Badawy

Advisors

: Jennifer Bremer, Ph.D.; Hamid Ali, Ph.D.; and Ghada Barsoum, Ph.D.

Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, as one of the most efficient social protection
programs, use large amount of public resources. Such programs are prone to leakage of public
resources due to risks from error, fraud, and corruption. Countries in Latin America have
implemented CCT programs since the early 1980‘s and they have experienced leakages from
error, fraud, and corruption (EFC) which requires use of mechanisms and a control system to
tackle the risks of EFC. These mechanisms have been introduced in the World Bank toolkit on
tackling error, fraud, and corruption. The recommended strategies to mitigate EFC address risks
through three main strategies: prevention, detection strategies, and deterrence.
This study answers the main research question of what guidance does Egyptian and
global experience provide as to what constitutes a proper control system for the implementation
of conditional cash transfer programs to prevent error, fraud, and corruption? It provides a vision
of what proper controls could be useful for implementing CCT in Egypt and other countries that
share similar characteristics.
This broader perspective of protection mechanisms has been investigated through
contacting global experts from different countries and local social inspectors who worked in the
pilot project in Egypt. This combination takes advantage of global and local experiences
recommend what could enable Egypt to have a proper control system to reduce EFC.
The study findings demonstrate that Egypt can apply proper administration and financial
controls in its CCT program at each of its three main stages: eligibility, compliance, and cash
disbursing. Recommended control mechanisms are developed around three building blocks of
prevention; detection; and deterrence. Other recommendations are provided for CCT program in
Egypt regarding interministerial cooperation, the required political support to CCT for program
success, use of computerized systems in the verification processes, and a reconsideration of
economic, political, and administrative challenges to CCT programs in Egypt.
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INTRODUCTION
Social protection programs usually consume large amount of public resources. Egypt, for
the last five decades, adopted in-kind subsidies as its primary approach to alleviate poverty and
move toward economic stability. In its way to do that , Egypt perform phases of economic and
social reform vary from the Egyptian government temptation to provide social economic model
during Nasser‘s era to the liberalization of Egypt economy and cut subsidies during Sadat‘s era.
Since 1991, subsidy policy has been partially reformed, and the Egyptian government even
eliminates subsidies on many products. Currently, only basic foods, energy, transport and
medicines are still subsidized by the government. In recent years the government has strategized
to address the gradual reduction of subsidies primarily on basic food items and energy provision
with medical services not considered a priority for liberalization.
The most recent controversy in regard to the restructuring plans for food subsidies is the
transformation from the country‘s ‗in-kind‘ system to a cash payment system that would directly
target those in Egypt that need it most. Since 2006, use of a ―smart card‖ to manage some
subsidized food distribution has been instituted and now covers 19 governorates. The concept
behind this is to monitor and identify where cash welfare payments need to go and minimize the
abuse of food subsidies, leakage to black markets, and maybe rationalize the use of other
services provided in the future such as health insurance, transportation, and pension.
The immediate problem of this program is that the government will have difficulty
reaching every citizen in need of subsidies as there is a severe lack of information on Egypt‘s
low income groups. At the same time both the government and public fear that transformation to
a cash payment system will result in a high rate of inflation (Egypt: government initiatives for
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subsidy reform, 2010). The source of fears may be coming from that the cash payment would not
keep up with inflation, whereas amount of cash is constant while goods prices moving upward.
The international community realizes the large needs for a mechanism that provide a social
protection programs to the poor. Consequently, starts to focus on more effective and efficient
social safety nets and in 2005 began to explore implementing the conditional cash transfer in
Egypt.
As the name implies, conditional cash transfers (CCT) provide cash transferred to poor
families, conditional on fulfilling a set of requirements that aim to create investments in human
capital, such as sending their children to school and making health checkups at health centers.
This program has been implemented successfully in different countries especially in Latin
America and it proves its ability to achieve short-run goals in improving health, educational, and
food nutrition in various countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and other countries around
the world. The context in which it has been applied differs from one country to another.
The success of the program implementation depends on the country administration
capacity, and the program effectiveness depends on existence of strong financial controls and
accountability mechanisms, which are critical to maximizing the expected outputs and targeting
the human development as per the program design. This research assesses CCT system controls
from administrative and financial perspectives in order to evaluate its ability to mitigate risks of
errors, fraud, and corruption.

Page 11

`

CHAPTER ONE: Statement of Problem and Study Rationale
Challenges that have been facing Egypt in its way to implement CCT program:
Although Egypt has tried out over recent decades several different social protection
programs to improve the social status for poor families, most of those programs failed to get the
poor out of poverty. The new trend around the world to implement conditional cash transfer
comes as a result of the finding that these programs demonstrate ability to improve the health,
education, and economic conditions of poor families. The cash transfer programs that have been
growing most rapidly across the developing world over the last decade or so are CCTs, by which
cash is paid to poor households on condition that they invest (in certain pre-specified ways) in
the human capital of their children.

The challenges to implementation of social protection programs include leakage of public
resources either because of market and/or administrative failures to allocate the resources to the
intended beneficiaries. It is imperative to put in place tools and mechanisms that guarantee the
efficient use of public resources to serve a large clientele. This research is trying to answer the
questions: what could be proper controls and accountability in the implementation of conditional
cash transfer in Egypt and what lessons could Egypt learn from other countries. To that end, the
research looked at what the standard mechanisms that were implemented successfully in other
countries‘ experiments.

CCTs in Egypt must be implemented in a way that responds to Egypt‘s realities, which
may briefly be characterized as follows:
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Overall about 44.4% of the Egyptian populations are in the range of extreme poor to near poor:
(The World Bank, 2007)

• 21% of the Egyptian population was near poor, meaning that about 14.6 million Egyptians can
obtain their basic food requirements in addition to some basic services.
• 19.6% of the Egyptian population was poor, meaning that about 13.6 million Egyptians (one
out of every five) had consumption expenditure below the poverty line and could not therefore
obtain their basic food and non-food needs.
• 3.8% of the Egyptian population was extreme poor, meaning that about 2.6 million of the
Egyptian poor could not obtain their basic food requirements even if they spent all their
expenditure on food.

Poverty has a strong regional dimension in Egypt and concentrates in Upper Egypt
region, both urban (18.6%) and rural (39.1%), while metropolitan areas are the least poor (5.7%).
The government is currently employing recently completed poverty map as tool for geographic
targeting of public resources.

That is why the Egyptian government over the past five decades has been trying to target
the poor and alleviate poverty especially in Upper Egypt. The Egyptian government applied
different methodologies to subsidize the poor and made different reforms (these will be covered
in the literature review of this research), until it has been decided to implement CCT programs in
Egypt. This effort has begun with a pilot project at a small scale in Ain El-Serra (a Cairo
district) and a second, larger pilot project in Upper Egypt.
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The implementation of CCT programs presents a large number of challenges. Although
CCT was implemented successfully in different countries especially in Latin America and has
proven its ability in achieving the short-run goals in improving health, educational, and food
nutrition in various countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile and other countries around the world,
the context in which it has been applied differs from one country to another. As well, it includes
large number of payments to poor families.

In Egypt, the program responsibilities are shared amongst various ministries,
governmental units and departments within the country and multiple international organizations.
Implementing a large project like the conditional cash transfer in Egypt needs a set of controls to
prevent the program from leakages due to error, fraud, and corruption. Egypt suffered from the
leakage of resources because of the poor targeting that is combined with system leakage such
that only one third of the existing subsidy goes to the needy. Consequently, their implementation
depends on country systems and its effectiveness depends on having sufficient planning,
existence of strong financial controls and accountability mechanisms— and the continuous
efforts to strengthen them as needed— which is critical to maximize the expected outputs and to
target the human development as per the program design. Implementing CCT in Egypt without
adequate controls on EFC will make the program more vulnerable to risks of fraud and
corruption. To avoid the risks of EFC, there should be mitigation strategies and controls in CCT
programs. These controls start at all stages in the program through the introduction of tighter
checks and safeguards.
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In the following section, three questions will be answered:


What are the risks of Error, Fraud, and Corruption that interfere
in the implementation of CCT programs?



What do pilot and international experiences tell us about
effective mechanisms in place to control EFC?



How and whether such experiences could be applied within
Egypt context?

What are the risks of Error, Fraud, and Corruption that interfere in the implementation of
CCT programs?
Figure 1: Typology of fraud and error in benefit systems

Source: RAND Europe
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According to the (The World Bank, 2007)‖; the causes of this leakage can be defined as follows:


Error is the unintentional violation of program or benefit rules,
resulting in the wrong benefit amount or payments to an
ineligible applicant. One can distinguish between official error
due to staff mistakes, and customer error which occurs when a
customer inadvertently provides incorrect information.



Fraud occurs when a claimant deliberately makes a false
statement, conceals or distorts relevant information regarding
program eligibility or level of benefits.



Corruption commonly involves manipulation of beneficiary
rosters (e.g. registering potential beneficiaries for clientelistic
purposes to garner political support); staff accepting illegal
payments from legal or illegal beneficiaries; or diversion of
funds to ghost or illegal channels.

Error, Fraud, and Corruption represent causes of the leakage of the CCT programs
resources. Although there is no system immune from EFC, there are examples from developed
countries showing the capability to reduce such leakage to acceptable levels. The leakages here
mean that the resources are not transferred to the right beneficiaries, in the right amount, and in
the right time.
―We do care about the EFC in social protection programs because even a small fraction
of leakages of resources could be presented in a large amount of resources.‖ (The World Bank,
2007): On average, social protection (SP) spending represents 15.7% of GDP in developed
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countries, 7.4% in middle-income countries (MICs) and 3.8% in low-income countries (LICs).
The information from developing countries is scarcer, as only few programs and countries have
taken measures to combat and/or measure the incidence of EFC. However, it is plausible to
expect the share of funds affected by EFC be larger compared to developed countries. For
example, in India a Government audit in 2003 found that 31.6% of Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY)
(housing programs) and 53.5% of Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) (welfare
program) funds did not reach the intended beneficiaries. In the case of the Sampoorna Grameen
Rozgar Yojana (SGRY ) (rural employment and food security initiative; India), an employment
program, administrative data report that 31.3 million man-days of work were generated in 200102, while the National Sample Survey data for 2002-03 estimate this number as less than 3
million man-days, only 10% of the official figure.

What pilot experiences tell us about effective mechanisms in place to control EFC?
There are many developing and even developed countries around the world that have
implemented the conditioning cash transfer; since the mid-1990‘s demand side programs linking
cash to behavior have been widely adopted across a range of countries (Aber and Rawlings,
2011). According to the World Bank review of the control and accountability mechanisms in
CCT programs in Latin America and Caribbean; it has noted positively that all programs
incorporate several accountability mechanisms, which can be reinforced by reviewing
institutional arrangements with attention to incentives, clarity of roles, and potential conflicts of
interest. The Review also noted the importance of continued strengthening of quality control—in
particular, feedback loops to enable continuous correction (The World Bank-Latin America and
Caribbean Region, 2007)
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The World Bank review provided the following facts that should be recognized:


While comparisons are limited by differences in benefits and
measurement standards, fraud and error rates in income support
programs in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States
generally range between 3.5 to 5.3 percent (UK National Audit
Office, 2006).



Adequate program accountability and control depend on a wide
range of factors and mechanisms, as well as on crosschecks and
feedback mechanisms among the related elements.



These programs are not isolated within their respective
countries‘ social policies, as they reflect the character of overall
governance at the national level. The risk assessment for any
program depends on its particular characteristics and national
context; and any recommendation needs to factor in the costs
and benefits of additional control activities.



Finally, the external experts advised that definitions of
―irregularity‖ must be considered carefully. It is important to
distinguish between fraud and other kinds of problem, such as
missing paperwork, administrative mistakes, MIS errors, and
weak service quality.
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The World Bank recommendations on control mechanisms that could be applied in Latin
America and Caribbean countries
In light of the control and accountability mechanisms that was recommended by the
World Bank to Latin America and Caribbean; a number of main recommendations could be
applied most broadly to CCT programs including Egypt are:


Institutional design. Provide polices that clearly defining the
intergovernmental relationship between governmental units.
This should cover the administration and service performance
and alignment of incentives to good performer or penalties to
whom not performing well.



Targeting and eligibility. More efforts should be directed to
possible exclusion errors (that is, eligible households not being
included)

and

consider

the

need

for

more

frequent

recertification of eligibility.


Conditionalities. Verifying the compliance to the conditionality
is a heavy burden on the implementation of CCT, that‘s why a
balance between accuracy and verification is highly required.



Payment processes. Methods of cash-flow and monitoring how
it is paid are an integral part in CCT monitoring and associated
control procedures.
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Internal quality control. Expand process evaluation, feedback
loops, and correction mechanisms within programs, particularly
through spot checks.



Accountability. Ensure appropriate mechanisms to handle
complaints and appeals in a timely manner, and publish
program data.



Financial management and auditing. Define payment
accounting and reporting requirements.



Focus audits on risks. Include supreme audit institutions.

Topic:
This study examines the implementing of planning and accountability controls on the
conditional cash transfer in Egypt. This research is investigating what should the measures be,
based on the pilot experience and global experiences, to have necessary but not sufficient
effective mechanisms in place to control Error, Fraud, and Corruption (EFC) at the three main
points of eligibility determination, compliance verification, and cash distribution. By having
adequate controls and mechanism of clear determination of accountability and responsibility
amongst different parties within the CCT program processes, and a system to work on Error,
Fraud, and Corruption; we may achieve the desired goals of CCT with minimum loss of
resources.
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Importance of topic:
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programs are adopted in different countries around the
world; it targets the poor and becomes one of the most effective tools to alleviate poverty and
provide mechanisms to build human capital among future generations. It creates an investment
in human capital through creation of contractual agreement with poor families. This relationship
set a partnership between poor families and government which was not known before in
developing countries. Another important aspect is the CCT objective to break the
intergenerational transmission of poverty. Studies of CCT programs have proven that these
programs can be well targeted, reduce the poverty of the poorest households, and improve
children‘s education and health status.
According to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) set by the United Nations (UN)
―The UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals concluded with the adoption of a
global action plan to achieve the eight anti-poverty goals by their 2015 target date and the
announcement of major new commitments for women's and children's health and other initiatives
against poverty, hunger and disease‖ (United Nations, 2010). The international community
realizes the large needs for a mechanism that provide a social protection programs to the poor.
The MDG is seeking to provide rights to the poor in the fields of food and nutrition, education,
health, and women empowerment and equality. Many conferences and researches pays attention
to the impact of conditional cash transfer as a tool for social protection, its strengths and
weaknesses, and the way it impacted the communities and families dynamics.
Since Egypt is part of the International community, it started to focus on more effective and
efficient social safety nets, the Egyptian government requested the World Bank in 2005 to
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prepare a report on improving the system of in-kind subsidies and social safety nets. This request
generated as part of the Egyptian government efforts to enhance its ability to provide the services
to the poor. The World Bank report found that, ―despite high and increased levels of social
spending, poverty in Egypt continues to be relatively high….the existing in-kind subsidy
programs – which form the basis of the current safety net - are costly, ineffective, create market
distortions and inefficiencies, and that benefit the rich far more than the poor‖ and recommended
that‖ the poor would benefit from a strengthening of the social safety net along the following
lines:


A significant expansion in the cash-assistance program to raise
the benefit levels and expand the coverage



Enriching the safety net with better targeting methods like
proxy-means testing and greater use of geographic targeting in
order to direct a substantial fraction of public resources to the
intended beneficiaries, while minimizing the leakage to the
wealthy



The introduction of a conditional-cash transfer program that
helps the poor enhance their human capital,



The introduction of a workfare program at very low wages that
provide temporary jobs for the able-bodied poor ― (The World
Bank, 2005)

Although the Egyptian Government (EG) may not be able to shift into the cash assistance
programs and replace the in-kind subsidy in short run, the conditioned cash transfer is a
challenge for the Egyptian government as it needs more controls than in-kind programs.
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Partially the success of the program in previous experiments, especially in Latin America‘s
countries, showed that a large percentage of its ability to succeed relies on the quality of the
government from the administrative perspectives and the financial and audit controls performed
to guarantee that the program is moving toward the targets for which the program is designed.
According to the Anti Corruption Resource Center (ACRC, April 2010) report on corruption
prevention strategies in cash transfer schemes; the absence of a systematic evaluation of the
effects of CT on corruption, there is no conclusive evidence that these are more prone to
corruption than payments in-kind (Marie, 2010).

Research questions
This study is going to provide an answer to the research question/s:
Main Question:


What guidance does Egyptian and global experience provide as
to what constitutes a proper control system for the
implementation of conditional cash transfer program to prevent
error, fraud, and corruption? Answering the following subquestions will provide answer to the main question

Sub-Questions


What are the administrative systems that would comprise a good
implementation of conditional cash transfer in Egypt?



 Eligibility
 Compliance (met the eligibility)
What are the financial and control systems that would maximize
and provide the best basis of conditional cash transfer in Egypt?


Cash disbursement
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CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review
This section covers the following points:


Overview of social protection programs applied in Egypt.


Subsidization of commodities and services to support
low-income brackets







Social Security …Pension for those without a pension



Egypt CCT pilots: Funding and Partnership

Why Conditional Cash Transfer may be appropriate for Egypt


Aspects of failure of the in-kind



Aspects of success of conditional cash transfer

Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) characteristics and global
experience


Egypt context



Challenges facing conditional cash transfer

Overview of social protection programs applied in Egypt.

The Egyptian Social Security system basically relies on contributions by the government to
support the poor. These contributions or subsidies took different forms in order to enhance the
Egyptian social equity and to support the ability of Egypt‘s poor to balance between their low
income and the increase in the cost of life. The forms of subsidization are many, some of which
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are the subsidy of commodities including food basic items which known as in-kind subsidy and
subsidization of medical services.

1. Subsidization of commodities and Services to support Low-Income Brackets:
Subsidization is one of the most essential tools for the Egyptian government to provide the
commodities to the poor with reasonable and affordable prices. Started since the World War II
and continue until present. In December 2005, a new ministry of social solidarity was
established, taking the competences of supply and social affairs ministries; while social
insurance affairs became under the competency of the Ministry of Finance

According to Egypt State of Information Services Year Book (2009)



The percentage of subsidization against the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was
increased by a ratio of .2% from 2004-2005- 9% to 2008-2009 – 9.2%



The per capita share of subsidization was doubled during the period 2004-2005, 20082009 to reach about EGP 1275 in 2008-2009 against EGP 686.5 in 2004-2005.



The value of commodities and services subsidization in 2008-2009 reached about EGP
94 billion, of which EGP 21 billion went to supplies commodities, EGP 63 billion for
petroleum products and EGP 10 billion for other programs such as housing and
transportation



Subsidy for supply commodities increased by 28% to reach EGP 21 billion in 2008-2009
against EGP 16.4 billion in 2007-2008.
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In contrast to the CCT, subsidies are working from the supply side by the government
without any action needs to be taken by the demand side which is the poor people. This approach
is working in one direction which is to provide the poor with food items. It does not provide a
mechanism on how to alleviate their living standards and transfer them from passive recipients of
assistance to partners with the government in improving their condition. Under CCT programs
the partnership will work for increase their living standards and break the poverty
intergenerational cycle in the society.

2. Social Security …Pension for those without a pension:
―The Ministerial Decree No 140 of 2005 stipulates that the minimum of social security
pension shall be LE 60 monthly for one person, and gradually increase to LE 80 in view of
number of family members, as of 1/7/2005. At that time, the number of beneficiaries hit 1
million families, with a total cost of LE 1 billion per annum. In addition, each family, benefiting
from the social security pension, receives a monthly grant of LE 20 for each child enrolled in
basic education during the academic year for 8 months as of 1/10/2005. In case of many basic
education enrolled-children within the same family, each receives the grant with a maximum of
LE 100. Social security system regulates the provision of the following services:


monthly aid



one-package aid



assistance to retired employees



relief aid



Children Pension, benefiting about 53,000 children, with an annual credit of LE 20
million by average EGP 31 / Month‖ (Egypt State Information System, 2009).
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Box 1: Subsidies and social safety net
According to World Bank (2006)
What is the Public Social Safety Net?
The public social safety net generally refers to the set of publicly-sponsored programs that provide
income or in-kind support and access to basic social services to the poorest and most vulnerable in
society. They are distinct from other forms of social protection including contributory social
insurance such as pensions, as well as labor market regulations and interventions.
Typical programs in many countries include:
● Cash transfers (also known as social assistance) such as family assistance, noncontributory old age
transfers or disability payments;
● In-kind transfers such as food rations and nutrition and feeding programs,;
● Price and tax subsidies for the poor;
● Targeted human-development programs/conditional cash transfers;
● Public workfare;
● Fee waivers for health, education or other basic services.
Egypt spends about 2 percent of its GDP on the core social safety net. It does not have every type of
program above, but resources are devoted to :
● Consumer subsidies on food (1.7 percent of GDP);
● SFD programs (0.18 percent of GDP); and
● Social assistance cash transfers from MOISA (0.12 percent of GDP).
The largest share of resources, 8.1 percent of GDP, is spent on energy subsidies to producers and
consumers which serve as an important safety net but also absorb resources that could be better
directed to the poor.
Sources: MOISA, SFD, and other GOE officials.
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According to (UNDP, 2010) ‗ The cash transfers, through social-solidarity-pension scheme,
currently covers more than one million poor households with a total cost in excess of EGP one
billion. The target is to double the number of households covered by this scheme within the year
2010/2011 at a total cost of EGP 1.6 billion allocated for this goal in the proposed budget.
Another EGP 5 billion is, allocated within the 2009/10 budget for miscellaneous social
assistances, aside from what the public budget allocates on an annual basis, as a government
share

There are other organizations and institutions working to provide social assistance to the poor. A
number of donors, notably UNICEF, WFP, UNDP played key technical roles in the
establishment of CCT program in the country creating the perception that the program was
donor driven and that its effort in partnership with government. Those international organizations
support the CCT program from technical perspectives such as design of the program and
providing consultation to the program team rather than financing the program which is fully
financed by the government that shouldered the whole bulk of required resources.

Some of those institutions, organizations, and banking are as follows:


Nasser Social Bank was established pursuant to Law No. 66 of 1971 with the aim of
expanding the social solidarity base through granting soft loans and aid for low-income
brackets. The bank is providing social assistance to the poor who do not have sources of
income (divorced, widows, handicapped).
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There is also a social pension for non-contributive monthly benefit paid on a meanstested basis to the elderly poor aged 65 and over. These people fall outside the irregular
employee and other pensions

3. Egypt CCT : Funding and Partnership
According to the operation manual of CCT in Upper Egypt (Sholakamy, Piloting CCT in
Egypt, 2010), the budget for the conditional cash transfer program consists of two distinct parts.
Firstly, the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) as the implementing agency is responsible for
the budget and the payment of the transfers to families and for providing the social workers in
order to implement the program. For its part, the Social Research Center (SRC) is fundraising to
cover the research, monitoring and evaluation portion of the budget. Currently, the SRC has
fundraised to cover the expenses until December 2010 and is continuing its efforts to ensure
financing until the end of the two-year experiment.
The donors financing SRC activities within the Upper Egypt CCT include the Ford
Foundation, UNDP Egypt and UNICEF Egypt.
UNICEF funds support the following activities:


Support for the design of a child well-being component (health and education),



Documentation of the process of design, experiment set up, training and initial
implementation,



Baseline results dissemination (workshops, conferences)



Technical support provided to the Ministry of Social Solidarity.

UNDP grant provided to the MOSS will ensure the technical assistance of the SRC in the Upper
Egypt pilot in the following areas:
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Training of social workers on CCT and building their capacity to work in the community
and to participate in research.



Designing the CCT package in accordance with the needs and resources of the villages
and the region of Upper Egypt.



Conceptualizing and implementing the experiment in a rigorous manner.



Production of information packages, baseline, monitoring and self-monitoring tools and
instruments that will enable the MOSS to implement the program.



Research the impact of the CCT on individuals, families and communities using
qualitative and quantitative methods.

UNDP is also exerting efforts to fight poverty in Egypt and it takes the initiative for a better
understanding of how market-based approaches to human development can ‗do good‘ for people
living in poverty while also being good for business. It is founded on the premise that ―inclusive
markets‖ that offer the poor access to basic goods and services and empower them economically
as consumers and producers can help lift them out of poverty. (UNDP, 2007)
A partnership with IPC-IG/UNDP Brazil has been formalized in order to provide
econometric and statistical support to the design, randomization and evaluation components of
the pilot. Furthermore, the SRC is actively seeking partnerships with other organizations and
individuals working in Upper Egypt. Areas that need to be covered by potential partners include
change in rural food markets and inflation (food, schooling, etc.).
Currently, discussions of support are ongoing with World Food Program (WFP) for
qualitative and quantitative evaluation as well as markets surveillance.
It is concluded (SRC, 2010) that the current social security system is not covering the whole
poor families within the society. To get such assistance, poor families should follow number of
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governmental procedures in order to prove the financial assistance conditions set by the
government are met in their cases. One of these procedures is to have official documentation
(birth certificate, social research by social workers to investigate their status of eligibility)

The following chart shows some of the currently exist social protection systems in the Egyptian:
Figure 2: Social protection systems in the Egyptian

In-Kind


Food Subsidies = 1.7 % of GDP –FY04


Baladi bread=1.3 % of GDP



Ration Card Goods B = .4% of
GDP

 Energy Subsidy= 8.1
% of GDP – FY04
 Electricity subsidy =
.2% of GDP- FY 04

Housing
Not available

The Poor

 Safety Net = .3 % of GDP – FY 04


Cash Transfer = .1 %



Social Development Fund = .2%

Source (The World Bank, 2005): EGYPT - TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE SOCIAL POLICY: SUBSIDIES AND SOCIAL
SAFETY NET
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The social safety net in Egypt has a wide range of social provisions. Although the
majority of workers are covered, there are gaps for casual and informal workers. The Egyptian
government was using the in-kind transfer as one of the means to achieve the social justice
during the past decades, however from the economic efficiency perspectives it has been
experienced that the in-kind transfers was not successful to target the poor and work to alleviate
the level of poverty amongst the poor and it could not break the intergenerational poverty in
Egypt.

Why conditional cash transfer in Egypt? (Failure and Success)
1. Aspects of failure of the in-kind support
The failure of the in-kind comes from different aspects some of which are ―When
policymakers intervene to set prices that are different from the marginal social benefit or
marginal social cost, as occurs in the case of in-kind transfer schemes, resources will be used
inefficiently‖ (Blackorby, 1998). The intention of any government from in-kind transfer is to let
people consume more than they would under market determined prices, however the inefficiency
cited in the previous statement means that in-kind transfers are ill-suited in conditions of
resource scarcity to give the maximum benefit from using these resources.

Another aspect is that in-kind transfer not only affects subsidized good prices but also
influences the market price of nonsubsidized goods. This happens when producer of subsidized
goods gain because they get the subsidized goods by lower prices from household and other
nonsubsidized goods prices can‘t compete because it is not profitable enough for traders when
compared to trading of subsidized goods in black-markets. Finally, and from a control
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perspective the in-kind transfer failed to target only the poor (Eligibility) and the subsidy goes to
both poor and non-poor families which influence the effectiveness of in-kind transfer programs.
This occurred because the in-kind transfer programs did not have adequate controls and
procedure to guarantee that only the poor families , will benefit from the program, assuming that
it is directed to the poor only rather than the whole population,.

In-kind transfer led to an excess burden on taxpayers because the cost of the subsidy is
greater than the value of the benefit received by the transfer recipient‖ (Raghbendra, 1995). This
is known economically as deadweight loss where the cost paid by the funders, usually taxpayers,
for in-kind subsidy, exceeds the benefits (going to the poor). The traditional social insurance
programs received many critics that everyone can benefit from current subsidy system and
because it lacks adequate monitoring, most of it goes to non-poor. On the other hand we can see
that CCT experiments ensured that most of those who need assistance actually receive it.
2. Aspects of success of conditional cash transfer
Based on similarly disappointing outcomes from in-kind subsidy schemes elsewhere,
alternative poverty alleviation programs emerged, notably ―Conditional Cash Transfer‖ (CCT).
According to the World Bank, "Conditional cash transfers provide money directly to poor
families via a ―social contract‖ with the beneficiaries – for example, sending children to school
regularly or bringing them to health centers. For extremely poor families, cash provides
emergency assistance, while the conditionalities promote longer-term investments in human
capital." (Nigenda, 2005)
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are increasingly perceived as an effective tool
for poverty alleviation. CCT programs have been highly successful in Latin American countries,
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and are increasingly perceived as a ―magic bullet‖ for poverty reduction, according to the World
Bank.
The Implementation of cash transfers in both developed and developing countries showed
successful experiments especially that most of the traditional social insurance programs have
failed to reduce poverty. Conditional cash transfer (CCT), placed itself as an important tool in
the social safety nets because it started with the initiation to ―provide recipients with greater
freedom of choice and give recipients a higher level of satisfaction at any given level of income
than is the case with in-kind transfers‖ (Hyman, 1999)
.
Well-known programs that follow this approach include (Opportunities) in Mexico, Bolsa
Escola(School Allowance welfare program) and Bolsa Familia (Family allowance welfare
program) in Brazil, Red Protection Social program in Nicaragua, Program for Assisting Poor
Families in Honduras, Program of Advancement through Health and Education in Jamaica,
Food-for-Education (FFE) in Bangladesh, and Subsidio Unico Familiar (Subsidize Poor
Families) in Chile (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006) . Most of these programs prove ability to break
the intergenerational poverty and helps in increasing number of children educated and enhancing
the health conditions of poor families.
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Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Characteristics


Conditional Cash Transfers: a Global Perspective

The transfer is a resource that allows families to access health and educational services at
less of a burden.

Although CCT programs are controversial in terms of the necessity of

conditions and their efficacy in impacting some aspects of poverty, they have largely shown to
be successful in alleviating health and education burdens, and since the 1990s, have been applied
in dozens of countries around the world (Lagarde, 2007). CCT programs are suitable for middleincome countries with expansive infrastructure, like Egypt, due to the conditionalities requiring
families to access health and educational services. Additionally, CCTs can be adjusted to fit the
context in which they are applied: by changing targeting mechanisms, amounts transferred
conditions, or method of transfer.
Several characteristics for the implementation of CCT generate benefits beyond those
available in simple subsidy programs. First CCT programs target the poor and address gender
bias, since the transfer usually goes to the female heading the family1. Second, it builds human
capital by requiring school attendance, food nutrition, and health checkups. Third, the level of
cash transferred varies with the size of the family, number of children and their age and gender.
For example, the amount of cash to secondary student may be greater than those for primary
school because adolescent children are expected to have higher opportunity cost of attending
school, particularly for poor families.

1

For instance, Brazil‘s Bolsa Escola transferred monthly payments to poor households with children aged 6–
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Most of the literature on CCT pointed out that in order to apply the conditionality on the
cash and guarantee positive application of CCT, it is essential to ensure that the supply of social
services for education and health is enough and able to match the demand of the beneficiaries.
The prerequisites of implementing a successful CCT could be reconciled by providing schools,
hospitals, teachers, medical staff, management information system, and banking system and
postal offices.

According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2008), the success of CCT programs
in some countries is no guarantee that they can be reproduced in others with the same
performance. For instance, in many developing countries, children, particularly in rural areas,
face supply-related problems, i.e., there are not enough schools, classrooms, or teachers to offer
adequate education to those who need or want them. In such circumstances, pouring resources
into a CCT program may not be able to achieve the educational objective. Thus, in low-income
countries with limited social service infrastructure, CCT programs should integrate demand-side
with supply-side issues in order to avoid policy inconsistency and resource wastage (Hyun,
2008).
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Egypt from piloting to large scale implementation of CCT
In this section the study discusses the experience with CCT in Egypt, including:


Egypt from piloting to scale up implementation of CCT
The Egyptian government through implementation of different social policies and

economic reforms has tried to achieve social justice and fighting the poverty. After the
successful implementation of CCT programs in different countries around the world, Egyptian
government represented by MOSS and MOF in cooperation with SRC decided to go through
CCT experiment beside the other current social policies and programs in order to share its
fruitful results. Experiments with conditional cash transfer program are being implemented in
a slum in Cairo. The pilot program in the district of Ain El-Serra, under the administration of
the Ministry of Social Solidarity aims at empowering women and alleviating poverty in one of
the poorest areas within greater Cairo. SRC took initiative step and get an approval from the
minister of social solidarity in Egypt, to apply a pilot study in partnership with the ministry.

The objective of the initial pilot project is to demonstrate a new approach that could shift
social policies addressing urban poverty in Egypt to a more effective assistance model.
Successful completion of the project may mark a departure from the existing government
subsidy system to a comprehensive package that aims to empower families and break the cycle
of dependency and poverty through improving their capabilities for self-reliance. In this strategy,
conditional cash-transfers allow families to meet their basic needs but greater emphasis is placed
on training and services offered by experienced mentors, advocates and specialists to identify
and eliminate the root causes which sustain poverty. After completing its piloting project, SRC
and MOSS prepared different studies and analysis in order to evaluate this experiment and to
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plan for another large scale project in Egypt, targeting more poor families in the poorest villages,
in Upper Egypt (Sholakamy, Piloting CCT in Egypt, 2010)


Ain El-Serra Experiment2 of Egypt, 2010:
The Egyptian CCT Pilot is being applied in two stages: in the urban slum of Ain El-Serra,

located in Cairo and in the governorates of Assiut and Sohag in Upper Egypt. The Ain El-Serra
pilot is being conducted as a small scale study.
Program Indicators
In 2007, the SRC conducted a survey of the informal housing community in Ain El-Serra,
to better understand what indicators for poverty would most suit the area. Based on this study,
three indicators were selected:


Families have at least one child under the age of 15



Families experience crowding, defined as more than three people to a
room



Families have high health burden

Institutionalization In late 2008, MOSS formed a committee to head the Ain El-Serra
program, and to liaise with the team at the Social Research Center. Additionally, in October
2008, the MOSS nominated social workers from Assiut, Sohag, and Ain El-Serra to participate
in the CCT program. The SRC trained the social workers on social policy, the CCT Program,
computer literacy, questionnaire development and application as well as on how to communicate

2

This section based on Operational manual of piloting project in Ain El Serra-Egypt
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with clients. Of the social workers participating, the SRC chose seven to participate in the Ain
El-Serra pilot.
Simultaneously, in late 2008, focus group discussions were carried out with women and
men from the area, to learn more about the specific needs with regards to women‘s work, costs
of child education, and health-seeking behavior. Based on this study, and reviews of other
programs, the following conditionalities were determined to be effective, amenable to
monitoring, and not burdensome to comply with:
Box 2: Conditionality of piloting program in Egypt
Component

Conditionalities

Education

Children < 15 years: later on becomes less than eighteen


Enrolled in school

reached by children



Attend min 85% of school days/ month

Health



Regular preventive care for children and adults



Children to complete immunization schedule by age 24

Raise

Improve

the

educational

health

status

level

and

utilization of health services

months


Pregnant women to attend Antenatal Care and Postnatal
Care (ANC, PNC) and give birth in health facility



Male and female adults to attend health education
sessions

Egypt Human Development Report, 2005 stated the interest of the Egyptian Government
on setting an intervention for alleviating poverty in the country (Sholakamy, Piloting a
Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt, 2010). In order to achieve this goal the Egyptian Ministry
of Social Solidarity (MOSS) launched a geographical targeting program to reach the poorest
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residents of the poorest 1000 villages. The MOSS then planned and partnered with the Social
Research Center of the American University in Cairo (SRC) to pilot a new social policy
program, a Conditional Cash Transfer, in 65 of these villages located in the rural Egyptian
context of the governorates of Sohag and Assiut3.
The Upper Egypt piloting project, now in the preparatory phase, will provide CCT to
more poor families in Sohag and Assiut, both governorates that suffer from high concentrations
of poverty (according to the poverty maps presenting the most poor villages and locations in
Egypt).

Challenges facing implementation of CCT programs in general:
In the context of the increasing prominence of conditional cash transfer and its existence
in the agenda of many of the developing countries, there is an urgent need to analyze the
challenges related to the implementation of CCT programs. Also, there should be
recommendations and solutions to overcome the challenges, some of which are as follows:
I.
II.
III.

3

Political challenges
Economic challenges
Administrative challenges

32 in Assiut and 33 in Sohag
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I.

Political Challenges:
Policy makers usually support the implementation of social protection programs, to win

votes, especially those for the poor and middle income families, but they are always focusing on
the short term where the election and re-election periods are in place. The willingness is
coming where policy makers promise that if elected they will focus on improving economic
conditions and address the problems of the poor as one of their main agenda.

Another aspect is that transfer programs without long-term political support provide little
more than stopgap assistance. When programs frequently stop and start, this weakens the public's
confidence in the security of future benefits and undermines incentives to pay contributions (for
insurance based programs) or to vote for existing budget-financed programs (Grosh, 1995).

Another aspect of the political challenges is where few of policy makers intervene in the
selection of the beneficiaries and decided to whom cash should be transferred or not. This
interference in the determination of who is eligible may open other kinds of discriminations
against ethnicity, minority, refugees, districts, and religions. Any of the previous political
interference will guarantee a failure of any conditional cash transfer program. In many cases,
social assistance programs are launched in the aftermath of a ―crisis.‖ When a crisis strikes,
politicians inevitably demand an immediate response. This can lead to the introduction of
programs that are expedient but poorly planned (Subbarao, 1997)
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II.

Economic Challenges:
In order to break the intergenerational poverty, there should be clear understanding of the

family‘s needs for utilities, education, and health. Without understanding how much a household
could afford to get the commodities, to send their children to schools, and to receive healthcare,
there is no hope to break the poverty cycle. Families need to understand that the purpose is that
when their children have a better education and health, they will be able to earn better living, and
will be better off compared to their parents. Studying the family from economic perspectives and
verify their basic needs will assist in designing conditional cash transfer where all or part of
those problem getting solved.

Usually cash transfers indexed to changes in the commodities prices, costs of living, or
minimum level of wages. In case of inflation, the level of prices increases and following to that
the index level increases which mean an increase of the cost of cash transfer. On the other hand,
when the economy suffer from recession, more people tend to apply for cash transfer programs
which put pressure on the outlay for cash transfer programs (Tanzi, 1997).

One of the most frequent complaints about both social insurance and social assistance in
developing countries is that the sums provided are too small to eliminate poverty for the
beneficiary groups (Van Ginneken, 1999.). This can be seen as a need to reconsider the amount
of cash transferred. The value of the cash should provide reasonable value to people where they
could be better off and less suffering from poverty and satisfy their basic needs.
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Another key challenge for CCT is to balance the individual‘s need for assistance and their
willingness to work while receiving cash payments. This dilemma is constructed from different
factors such as the institutional characteristics of the labor market, the labor laws in effect,
whether there are incentives to seek work and whether the incentives are strong enough, the labor
taxes as well affecting the tendency of labor to work in regulated labor sectors or in the shadow
economy (illustrated in Figure 3)
Figure 3: Labor Supply of the Poor and Transfers Cash
Wages

Labor Demand

Labor supply Ls2 (post transfer)

Labor supply Ls1 (pre-transfer)

W $ (Fixed)

Labor
L2

L1

Source: (The World Bank, 2002)

―The labor supply curve of the transfer recipients shifts to the left, from Ls1 (pre-transfer)
to Ls2 (post transfer) because they receive some income without working. The effect on
employment depends on the nature of both labor demand and supply. If labor demand is
perfectly inelastic (in other words, is not affected by the wage rate) and the wage rate is fixed,
then employment falls from L1 to L2 with a maximum loss of output. It can be concluded that if
the amount of cash transferred is not equal to the wages foregone, some families may still be

Page 43

`

willing to keep their children in school and to reduce their labor somewhat‖. (The World Bank,
2002).
Presumably, all families will prefer the cash-plus-school option if the cash transferred is
equal to or greater than the wage rate, and thus the labor supply will be more affected than is the
case for lower payments. While this simplified model ignores important features of the labor
market, it illustrates the risk that overly generous transfer programs will reduce employment‖.

III.

Administration Challenges:
There are large administrative challenges facing the implementation of conditional cash

transfer. As stated previously, the governmental capacity to provide services to the poor. There
should a previously existing health, and education infrastructure and governmental personnel
capacity in place.

Targeting the beneficiaries (eligibility) is one of the greatest administrative challenges in
any conditional cash transfer programs. To do that, means tests and income tests are used to
establish fair eligibility standards and criteria for cash distribution in developed countries but this
method is difficult to apply accurately in developing countries and would likely exclude a large
number of the poor. In addition, the selection criteria should be simple and understood by the
poor because they may not apply if the procedures and criteria is complex.

Administrating the beneficiary data:
The need for strong management of information systems is very crucial before
implementing CCT. Due to the inclusion in CCT of large payments of cash, leading to a need for
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good cash management, it is very important to have information systems that are able to trace the
eligible beneficiaries, keep track of their records, monitor the amount of cash transferred to each
family, reduce the processing time for payments and reduce the opportunity for corruption. This
situation gives rise to the need to use unique identification number for the beneficiaries such as
the national ID numbers (―bitaqa‖) amongst different social security programs, in order to avoid
duplication in the process of providing the services to poor families. Allowing information
sharing among the different MIS and different units within the government will reduce cost of
operation and guarantee accurate data for planning and evaluation of social safety programs.
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CHAPTER THREE: Methodology
Basic Aim of the Research
In order to address the research questions, this study is to conduct interviews,
questionnaires, and focus group discussions which directed respectively to the CCT local
consultants, global experts, and social workers in Egypt.

This study analyzed the standard contents and mechanisms of controls that were applied
in the other countries‘ CCT programs and provide what could fit Egypt‘s context and constitute a
proper control and accountability system. The following step examines the design of CCT from
implementation standpoint and the implemented polices and procedure to guarantee that the
program will target the poor and achieve adequate controls on both the administrative and
financial perspectives. To do this, this study used the World Bank toolkit on tackling Error,
Fraud, and Corruption as the basis for his research evaluation process at each of the CCT
program stages eligibility, compliance to program conditionality, and cash disbursing to poor
families.

The World Bank toolkit intent is to provide a concise but thorough resource for social
protection practitioners on how to minimize error, fraud and corruption in their program(s). The
World Bank in this toolkit provides a generic framework for combating EFC (Van Stolk, 2010),
developed around four building blocks of prevention; detection; deterrence; and measurement.
This study chooses measures of prevention, detection, and deterrence for combating EFC and
excluded other measurement and monitoring since it is out of the scope of this research. The
World Bank finds that it is useful to look at the EFC control strategies of developed countries.
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These strategies tend to be the most comprehensive and evidence on their effectiveness exists.
Developed countries‘ experience shows that reducing EFC is feasible and cost-effective

Other measures are added by this study to the list of measures surveyed and it was
combined with those of the World Bank to introduce the list of measures that are surveyed in this
research. The addition of these measures came from accounting and management principles that
match accountability vs. responsibility. In this principle, this study has seen that, adding
measures to make beneficiary, officials, and program staff accountable, would improve standards
to reduce EFC in CCT programs.

This study is going to find which of the provided measures by the World Bank are
implemented to mitigate EFC in the examined three stages and to which degree these measures
could be implemented in Egypt. Further, the study is not only examining this, but also to
introduce the other measures beside those of the World Bank and shed light on which would be
most likely to work to avoid EFC in Egypt. The latter step covers different elements in order to
evaluate the program plans, controls, checks and balances.

In summary, this study hypothesizes that other countries‘ successful application of
mechanisms to control Error, Fraud, and Corruption could be useful and contribute to the
implementation of CCT in Egypt. Successful cases of developing countries like Brazil, Mexico,
Chile, and other countries might be worthy of emulation. In the next chapters the research will
review and present different alternatives to filling the gaps of what Egypt has and what Egypt
needs to control and protect the resources that are invested in its new CCT program.
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The systematic qualitative assessment provides answers for the research questions and
introduces a general set of recommendations to policy makers‘ and assessment of measures
needed in the implementation of a CCT program in Egypt.

Design and data

This study is focuses on how to protect the conditional cash transfer in Egypt from Error,
Fraud, and Corruption. Since the program is in its first phases and not matured enough, the
examination of controls systems are very crucial and will benefit all the interested parties in the
CCT program not only in Egypt but also for other countries that wish to implement such social
welfare programs. Any system has its own components. The main components of the conditional
cash transfer system could be presented as follows:

Government (G): Government needs to achieve some goals from implementing CCT and in
order to achieve those goals, it employs its capacity to support the program in forms of planning,
financing , implementing, monitoring, and using outputs in adjusting the plans . The
implementation of CCT program in Egypt is presented under Egypt‘s Ministry of Social
Solidarity (MOSS). MOSS is piloting the CCT in rural areas of Upper Egypt to test whether this
innovative social protection program is an appropriate, effective and empowering tool within the
Egyptian context. The outcomes of the two year pilot will inform the Government‘s decision on
scaling-up to a nationwide level.
Poor Families (F): The poor families in villages of Sohag and Assiut governorates in Upper
Egypt represent the customers that the government needs to serve. The main goal is to provide
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those families with adequate capability and access to education, health services, and nutrition.
On the other side, poor families need to do certain behavior as partners to ensure the success of
the program and break the cycle of poverty.
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT): This represents the program as a standalone unit that has its
own design, polices, regulations, and operation. The cash transfers will be financed by the MOSS
and the research expenses by the Social Research Center (SRC) grants. Implementation in the
field will be executed by MOSS social workers that will receive additional training and
supervision by SRC. The conditionality is coming from the enforced actions or behavior that
should be followed by poor families in order to get the cash. Cash is transferred once the
conditionality is met.

The three elements present the system or environment where the CCT is implemented.
There is a large flow of resources that are moving from government to CCT program and finally
ends to poor families. Because CCT includes transfers of large amounts of money and other
public resources, there is the risk that these resources will not reach the intended beneficiaries.
The risk may include intervention by some or all of the following risks factors; errors, fraud, and
corruption. There is no guarantee that the interaction between the elements will produce the
desired results unless there is a proper control mechanism.
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Triangle Approach

The system could be presented in the form of triangle. This approach provides a triangle
with three angles; each angle presents one of the system‘s three main elements; G, F, and CCT.
The components of any system cannot work by its own without interacting with one another. The
interaction between the elements may take one of the following forms:



Interaction between G and F:



Interaction between F and CCT:



Interaction between CCT and G:

Figure 4: Triangle approach of CCT parties

F: Poor Families

System
Controls
’
CCT Program

G: Government
S

Control
System

S
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A risk comes in absence of adequate controls on these interactions. Different forms of risk comes
through the interaction process as described below
Risk at the interaction between G and F:
Risk of Error: This type of risk is related to eligibility of poor families, where the
Government falls in an unintentional violation of the program rules, inclusion (to
ineligible) or exclusion errors (of eligible) beneficiaries, transfer of cash methodology,
and non effective validation system.

System errors: This includes the failure of payment system, failure of IT systems,
problematic information management, and inadequate monitoring or reporting procedures

Risk at the interaction between F and CCT:
Two types of risks related to compliance (met the eligibility) come here;
Fraud: when families intentionally abuse the program. This could happen when families
provide a false statement, risk of collusion, conceal or distort their relevant information
especially the information regarding program eligibility (number of rooms, number of
children, sources of income.etc) and compliance with the conditions.
Corruption: when program staff intentionally abuse the system rules for their own or
others‘ benefits. Corruption here involves manipulation of beneficiary rosters (maybe for
political reasons), receiving illegal payments or benefits from other parties, transfer of
funds to nonexistent persons or illegal channels.
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Risk at the interaction between CCT and G:
Risks are many some of which are government errors, such as inability to secure;
management of funds, the disbursement of cash, which will be discussed thoroughly in
this research, provide transparent criteria for eligibility where it is set clearly who is
eligible and who is not. Also, errors may come from override internal controls or
breakdown.
Program staff corruption, such as when program staff is involved in manipulation of the
controls set by the government to achieve self interest (receiving illegal payment, or
diverting payments to ghost beneficiaries). Monitoring, managing the large amounts of
information, and finally the most important, from standpoint of EFC, ensuring existence
of mechanisms of financial management and auditing.

Fraud as a result of the complexity of the social protection system: This includes crossjurisdictional claims and complexity of rules and regulations

The assessment of system administration and financial controls and its ability to avoid
errors, fraud, and corruption will reveal how effective the system is. Therefore, in this
study, the research tools to make an assessment of the effective administration and
financial controls and their ability to protect the system from EFC, will be used.
It may be that this research cannot cover and assess the whole scope of the risks around
the implementation of CCT in Egypt due to the limitation of resources and time but the
research will focus on the most important ones that must be addressed for the integrity of
the program.
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Method of Obtaining Information for the Data Items

The methods of obtaining information for such data items were the distribution of two
types: (questionnaires and focus group discussion). The first type of questionnaires directed to
global experts and local social workers in Egypt piloting program. It was modified to ask about
respondent‘s background and program back ground. This modification to the expert
questionnaire added more value to the other data collected about mitigation mechanisms of error,
fraud, and corruption at the program three stages. Additional modification related to removal of
repetitive meaning, phrasing, and those questions that looks very technical such those about
auditing and accounting activities. Also, the questionnaire has been tested with one of Egypt‘s
expertise in terms of language and adequate timing. The expert questionnaire divided into four
sections:
Section A: Respondent Background characteristics
Section B: Program Background characteristics
Section C: program eligibility Criteria: 12 eligibility criteria have been used to test the
complexity of eligibility criteria at different countries and its impact on the measures to
mitigate EFC in CCT.
Section D: Measures that have been used to discourage error, fraud, and corruption in
CCT programs at each of the following stages


Deterrence: Seven measures to deter EFC in CCT



Eligibility: cover the following measures:
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1.

Five measures to prevent EFC

2.

Four measures to detect EFC

Compliance to program conditionality
1.

Five measures to prevent EFC

2.

Eight measures to detect EFC

Cash disbursement
1.

Three measures to prevent EFC

2.

Seven measures to detect

Survey-monkey website used to serve this type of questionnaire since it is easy and familiar to
experts. Also, it is easy to analyze and extract the data from it.
The second type is interviews and focus group discussion directed to social workers
whom served in Egypt local piloting project in Ain El-Serra. Since the pilot project in its early
phases and were covering small number of beneficiary, the interview and focus group discussion
are seeking social workers point of views on how best to implement conditional cash transfer
programs in Egypt in the future on a larger scale focusing on mechanisms to mitigate error,
fraud, and corruption, based on the experience in the pilot project, their professional knowledge,
and to the best of their ability.
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Method of Data Collection
Interviews:
In the preliminary research phase, interviews have been conducted by this study with
experts from social research center at the American university in Cairo, besides expert from
UNICEF- monitoring and evaluation unit in Cairo. I interviewed those experts as the topic needs
expert matter persons in order to transfer the knowledge they get from the field and to get their
advice based on their experience and knowledge about the Egyptian context.

Questionnaires:
The standard measures to mitigate EFC, have been taken from the World Bank paper on tackling
EFC (Van Stolk, 2010) and have been used in the research surveyed questionnaire

The study of the previous country experiments that was previously introduced created a
relationship between their pioneer experiments as ―best practices‖, which inspired other
countries like Egypt to follow their experiences, and our expectation behind the implementation
of same programs. It was also chosen since it was composed of simple phrases that could easily
be translated to the Arabic language without causing confusion.

Providing another version of questionnaire to social workers who served at piloting local
CCT program was very helpful. In addition, a focus group discussion was held with the social
workers who worked in the Ain El-Serra pilot project to explore their future visions on how to
improve CCT program in Egypt regarding EFC measures. Two job classes were involved in the
focus group: program administrative director and five social workers.
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The method of data collection depended on self-administered surveys; almost 40
measures are primarily distributed through online survey-monkey. This distribution method was
chosen to ensure higher response rate and increased cooperation on the part of respondents, as
well as the ability to choose participants that exactly fit the parameters of interest. However, this
targeting was in no way biased or planned in advance.

Focus group discussion
The focus groups were conducted a few hours after the questionnaire to allow the
participant‘s time to reflect on the topic. They were all conducted by this study to control for any
differences that might occur. The focus groups were conducted using pre-specified questions that
were prepared based on the global experts‘ responses to the expert questionnaire version.
Finally, the proposed recommendations and actions that have to be taken to improve the
implementation of CCT program and achieve the required goals are presented and discussed
from point of whether they are consistent with Egyptian law and procedures.

Emailing
Emailing global experts following to the questionnaire on their views of common risks of
error, fraud, and corruption in CCT and their vision on how to mitigate such risks are obtained
thorough e-mailing two questions serving these purpose. This methodology added valuable
inputs from experts worked as consultants for CCT programs in other countries. The questions
were as follows:
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Please tell me from your own perspective; what are the most
famous causes for error, fraud, and corruption in CCT program?



What is the most workable measure to mitigate error, fraud, and
corruption in CCT program?
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CHAPTER FOUR: Description of Data Collected
The research samples are directed to two main groups:


Global experts and program managers from around the world
countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Chile, other countries.



Local experts from researchers, consultants, officials, and social
workers who worked in piloting of CCT program in Egypt.

The research sample of global expert persons is limited but representative, it depends on expert
matter from different programs and organizations. The questionnaire is distributed to more than
250 expert, consultant, program director, field worker, donors.etc, received 54 respond of which
are 32 completed.

The research sample of local social workers (group of six persons and a head), presents
100 Percent of social workers worked in piloting in Ain El-Serra project. The social workers
were not told that this was a study on fraud and corruption so as not to bias the results. Both
questionnaires that were used composed of almost 40 questions excluding data on the
respondent‘s background, program background, and eligibility criteria that was used. Questions
regarding respondent‘s background and program background were seen as necessary group the
sample within the same pattern of experience and background and find what the distribution of
these groupings is.
A pretesting of the questionnaire was done on local expert in CCT and local social
worker whom fit the parameters of interest, but no significant changes were made. The survey
was done by using survey-monkey for global experts and visiting the local social workers at their
local social unit in Ain El-Serra and it took around one month to collect the data required.
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Each data item was assigned a specific number of questions included in the scoring sheet
(Appendix 1and Appendix 2) and respondents were asked to rate the measures of mitigating
error, fraud, and corruption on an ordinal scale by giving their choice to one of the following
answers:


The measure is not used (Score of one has been assigned to this answer)



The measure is used and was highly effective (Score of five has been assigned to this
answer)



The measure is used and somewhat effective (Score of four has been assigned to this
answer)



The measure is used with low level of effectiveness (Score of three has been assigned to
this answer)



The measure is used and not effective at all (Score of two has been assigned to this
answer)



Don‘t know/ Not sure (Score of Zero has been assigned to this answer)

Following the directions of the original questionnaire scoring key, answers were given
scores of 0 to 5 that were later re-coded by multiplying the standard score of each choice by
the total number of participants who chose this answer. To group respondents into high and
low categories, those in the high category were respondents who answered ―used and high
effective‖ or ―used and somewhat effective‖ ‖, while those in the low category answered
―used with low level of effectiveness‖ or ―used and was not effective at all.‖ Answers of
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―Not sure/ don‘t Know‖ were excluded in subsequent analysis. This grouping was done due
to the ordinal nature of the data.

To identify the significant correlation, this study looked to the table of correlation
coefficient at degree of freedom: df = n-2 (where n the number of surveyed experts), and level of
significance= 0.05. The result is a value of correlation coefficient equal to .349. That means, if
the absolute value of the correlation coefficient were less than .349, there is not a statistically
significant correlation between provided measures and if it exceeds .349, it is assumed to have
significance correlation between the two tested measures. This principle will be applied through
the whole statistical analysis in this research.

To answer the research question/s, the research worked on the successful implemented
financial and administrative elements in global countries that implemented CCT program. To
answer the sub-questions, the research is worked on two separate sections for assessments. The
first section is for the administrative elements, and it discusses avoiding EFC risks at stages of
Eligibility and Compliance. The second section is for the financial elements, and it discusses
avoiding EFC risks at Cash Disbursement. Each of which covered in the assessment process and
how it impacts the program.
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Respondents Background Characteristics: (covered by questions from Q # 1 to Q # 5)
The sample obtained was composed of 40% female respondents and 60% male
respondents, most of whom (41% of participants) were between the ages of 35 and 55. Survey
respondents broken down according to their experience with CCT programs activities are as
follows:
Figure 5: Respondents distribution by activities

Implementor : Management activities

21%

Implementor : Admin. & Finance activities

7%

Donor

9%

Consulting

49%

Conducting Field Work

14%
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Translating these activities into job title of the participants and their role in the CCT
program shows that the surveying was directed to a variety of experts from different
backgrounds which enriched the inputs and added value to the analysis. Some of the participants
job titles are; Monitoring and Evaluation Manager, Policy Specialist, Associate Professor,
Director of Operations, Health Sector Consultant, officer in the national Social Cabinet,
international consultant, Researchers, General Director Programming and Budget, Ministry of
Finance. Full list of survey participants job titles, and role in the program presented in Appendix
3, and Appendix 4 respectively.
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Program Background Characteristics: (covered by questions from Q # 6 to Q # 9)
Country of implementation
The respondents represented a variety of geographical areas where CCT programs have
been implemented. This variety provided the different contexts of implemented controls in CCT
programs. These geographical areas grouped and used in the data analysis to see whether cross
sectional analysis of the applied mechanisms of control could provide information on patterns of
applications and level of maturity on EFC controls.
From the below graph, although the survey has been distributed to various experts around
the world, we can conclude that the majority of respondents are form Mexico, Brazil and Turkey.
This may refer to level of transparency and maturity in these programs and real willingness from
these program experts to share their experience and results with the rest of the world.

Figure 6: Respondents categories by country of implementation
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Area in which the CCT program is implemented
72 Percent provided that the program is implemented in both rural and urban areas, 20 Percent
in rural areas only and only 8Percent provides that CCT is implemented in urban areas only.

Figure 7: Respondents categories by area of implementation

Total number of beneficiaries covered by the program
The number of beneficiary was very important characteristic because it tells us how the
applied controls worked in countries with large number of beneficiaries. 56Percent of the survey
participants provided their responses on EFC controls in countries with more than three million
beneficiaries including some (5 countries) up to 50 million beneficiary, 35Percent with less than
half million, 3Percent falls between .5 and 1 million, and 6Percent reported that 2 million
beneficiary
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Figure 8: Number of beneficiaries household covered by the program

Number of beneficiaries

35.3%

Less than or equal half
million beneficiery
A million of beneficiries
Two million benefciery

55.9%

Three million beneficiery
2.9%
5.9%

―Summary about Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in some countries are provided in
Appendix 5‖
Research Limits:

1.

Subject limits:
The limited published papers about the implemented pilot program in Egypt, most of
the published sources are in forms of presentation, slides, newspapers articles, and little
from official sources.

2.

The challenge and risk beneath a comparison of two different programs being
implemented in different environments, program level of maturity, geography, timing,
political, and economic conditions.

3.

The information from developing countries is scarcer, as only few programs and
countries have taken measures to combat and/or measure the incidence of EFC
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4.

The implementation of the CCT in Egypt still in its early phases

5.

As well the subject of this research is new to Egypt and still not matured; thus this
study faced some sensitivity in discussing EFC. This sensitivity caused some
difficulties in gathering full details and information about the mechanisms, financial
and control polices (Lawaaeeh‘) that are already prepared but not yet published.

6.

Limited access to data through governmental and official employee from MOSS and
MOF.

7.

The analysis of data collected is limited to data gathered from global program expertise
and social workers working in Egyptian piloting program in Ain El-Serra.

8.

Local social workers pointed their views on mechanisms to mitigate error, fraud, and
corruption, based on their experience in the pilot project, their professional knowledge,
and to the best of their ability.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Analysis of Data
In this chapter, the results obtained from the questionnaires, interviews, e-mails, and the
focus groups are reported. They are organized in a question-answer format, where the results
obtained from each question are reported with the aid of some illustrative charts. The results are
divided into three sections:
1. Questionnaire, which includes the results obtained from two sources ; the experts and
social workers
2. Focus Groups, which includes the results obtained from the focus group discussion with
local social workers
3. Emails received form CCT experts viewing their visions on risks of EFC and visions on
how to mitigate these risks.

The data derived from questionnaires analyzed through use of MS-Excel (Add-in) data
analysis functions. Variables were described in terms of frequency and percentage. The tests
conducted included correlation analysis to examine the relationship between provided measures
to control EFC in CCT programs. In addition, the descriptive statistics such as mean values is
used.
Examining of eligibility criteria that was used into CCT programs (global Vs local context)
Covered by questions from Q# 10 to Q# 21
This study main goal in comparing the eligibility criteria that was used in global CCT
programs, and compare it with same criteria that was used in Egypt is to determine whether
Egypt can benefit from other countries experience on setting eligibility criteria to avoid targeting
error.
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According to the World Bank ―The extent of targeting errors indicates whether the
program achieves its (poverty alleviation) objective or not. These errors may be due to program
design (when, for administrative feasibility, the program uses imperfect poverty proxies to
identify poor beneficiaries) and to program implementation (when eligibility decisions diverge
from the program rules). The later errors are, in turn, due to error, fraud or corruption‖ (Toolkit
on Tackling Error, Fraud and Corruption in Social Protection Programs, 2010)

The input from both global experts and Egypt local social workers on the questions on
whether any of the following eligibility criteria have been used or not, can be explored in the
following schedule:
Schedule A: Comparison of used eligibility criteria between global experts vs. Egypt Piloting
CCT
Eligibility criteria

Egypt – Piloting CCT project

Global experts

of Ain El-Serra
Eligibility criteria

Used

Not Used

Used

28 %

72%

100%

29.0%

71.0%

100%

25.0%

75.0%

20%

90.0%

10.0%

100%

Not Used

description
dwelling unit size / number
of rooms
Number of people per room
(crowding)
Marital status of the

80%

household
Whether a family has
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children less than 18 years of
age
25.0%

75.0%

39%

61%

37.0%

63.0%

41%

59%

100%

Whether the family has child 15%

85%

100%

Whether any of the

100%

household head has a health
burden
Whether household head is

100%

working
Whether there is a social

100%

security payment received
by household
Was there an accessibility of
the household to social
protection schemes

labor

The above schedule show the eligibility criteria that was used in different CCT programs
around the world and those criteria that was used in Egypt piloting CCT program. The use of the
housing indicators (dwelling / number of rooms, the crowding per room), was considered one of
the eligibility criteria in Ain El-Serra piloting project. Also, the criterion of whether the
household suffers from a health burden was used, and both criteria‘s are somewhat different
from global practice. This may explained in that the Egyptian programs is at early
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implementation phase (still a pilot) and may be different when scaled up. In addition, this
approach may suit the Egyptian context in geographical areas such as Ain El-Serra.

Some of the global experts provided that they have used other eligibility criteria that are
formed by 17 variables to categorize households socioeconomically, and then targeting specific
households. Others provided methods like number of school-age children, whether the household
has a dirt floor, and whether the family has a car and other appliances (refrigerator). Another
programs uses proxy means test that includes many variables of demographic characteristics of
the family, education, labor participation and income of family
In general, to avoid targeting error where poor families may be excluded from the
program, the eligibility criteria should be simple and understood by families. The simplicity of
eligibility criteria will reduce the targeting errors and support the program efforts to avoid fraud
action by non eligible families who try to gain access to the program benefits.
Examining of deterrence measures applied into CCT programs Covered by questions # 22

Under this section, program use of seven possible measures to deter and discourage EFC
in CCT program was explored. Possible answers included that the measure was not used, was
used with different degrees of effectiveness (Highly effective, somewhat effective, low level of
effectiveness, not effective at all), or was unknown to the respondent.
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Figure 9: Deterrence measures used in CCT programs

Not used

120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

Was used and was Highly
effective

Use
administrative
penalties or…

Use
administrative
penalties or…

Establish public
awareness
campaigns to…

Strengthening
laws and
regulations that…

Strengthening
laws and
regulations that…

Putting in place
strong criminal
penalties for…

Training staff to
ensure they have
a clear…

Was used and Somewhat
effective
Was used with low level of
effectiveness
Was used but not effective at
all
Not sure/don’t know

The descriptive analysis of data set shows the following (Appendix # 6)


The measure ―Establish public awareness campaigns to
ensure beneficiaries and community members understand
how the program will deter fraud and corruption” has got
support by most of CCT program experts since it was used with
high effectiveness and got a high score of 58Percent.



However, the measure of ―Training staff to ensure they have
a clear understanding of what constitutes error, fraud, and
corruption” came in the second level of preferences and it was
scored 55Percent as it was used with high effectiveness.



On the third level of scoring the measure of ―Use
administrative penalties or formal cautions directed to
clients who provide incorrect compliance information” with
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only 31Percent of the respondents confirmed that it was used
and somewhat effective to mitigate EFC.


A low scoring are recorded for the following measures :


Putting in place strong criminal penalties for
fraudulent actions by program staff or beneficiaries ;
52 Percent not using this measure compared to only
3Percent use this with high effective and 15Percent
using it with somewhat effective



Strengthening laws and regulations that govern
punishment for fraud or corruption by beneficiaries;
33 Percent not using this measure compared to only
15Percent use this with high effective and 6Percent
using it with somewhat effective



Strengthening laws and regulations that govern
punishment for fraud or corruption by program
officials; 33 Percent not using this measure compared to
only 6Percent use this with high effective and 21Percent
using it with somewhat effective



Use administrative penalties or formal cautions
directed to school officials who provide incorrect
compliance; 27 Percent not using this measure
compared to only 21Percent use this with high effective
and 30Percent using it with somewhat effective
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The previous measures are scored as not used measures in most countries except in the
older programs such as Brazil and Mexico where these programs tend to use these measures at a
higher rate. , Other reasons of not using such measures might include social or political
unacceptability of punishing these people, or fear of losing the cooperation of school officials or
others needed for the program to succeed.
Furthermore, and according to the World Bank toolkit to control EFC report; ―the
deterrence controls in general ―underutilized‖ in developing countries CCT programs. The
reasons of underutilization vary, some because of lack of laws and regulations of overpayment
cases, and the absence of clear definition of fraud in social security systems‖. Further
investigation may be requested to stand for reasons of not using such measures‖.
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Table 1: Descriptive analysis of deterrence measures

Training staff to
ensure they have a
clear understanding
of what constitutes
error, fraud, and
corruption

Putting in place
strong criminal
penalties for
fraudulent actions
by program staff
or beneficiaries

Strengthening
laws and
regulations that
govern
punishment for
fraud or
corruption by
beneficiaries

Strengthening laws
and regulations
that govern
punishment for
fraud or corruption
by program
officials

Establish public
awareness to
ensure
beneficiaries
understand how
the program will
deter fraud and
corruption

Use administrative
penalties or formal
cautions directed to
school officials
who provide
incorrect
compliance

3.58

Use
administrative
penalties
directed to
clients who
provide
incorrect
compliance
information.
2.61

Mean

3.52

1.27

1.42

1.48

Median

5.00

1.00

1.00

Mode

5.00

1.00

-

1.00

5.00

4.00

1.00

-

5.00

4.00

Sum

116.00

42.00

47.00

1.00

49.00

118.00

86.00

50.00
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Table 2: Correlation analysis between deterrence measures
Deterrence
measures

Training staff to
ensure clear
understanding of
what constitutes EFC
Putting criminal
penalties for
fraudulent actions by
program staff
Strengthening laws
and regulations for
FC by beneficiaries
Strengthening laws
and regulations for
FC by program
officials
Establish public
awareness campaigns
to ensure fullunderstanding on
how to deter FC
Use administrative
penalties or formal
cautions on who
provide incorrect
compliance info.
Use administrative
penalties to school
officials who provide
incorrect compliance

Training staff
to ensure
they have a
clear
understandin
g of what
constitutes
error, fraud,
and
corruption

Putting in
place strong
criminal
penalties
for
fraudulent
actions by
program
staff or
beneficiarie
s

Strengthenin
g laws and
regulations
that govern
punishment
for fraud or
corruption by
beneficiaries

Strengthenin
g laws and
regulations
that govern
punishment
for fraud or
corruption by
program
officials

Establish
public
awareness
campaigns
to ensure
beneficiarie
s and
community
members
understand
how the
program
will deter
fraud and
corruption

Use
administrativ
e penalties or
formal
cautions
directed to
clients who
provide
incorrect
compliance
information.

Use
administrativ
e penalties or
formal
cautions
directed to
school
officials who
provide
incorrect
compliance

1.00

0.33

1.00

0.26

0.36

1.00

0.40

0.66

0.68

1.00

0.73

0.12

0.33

0.20

1.00

0.24

0.31

0.26

0.34

0.37

1.00

0.36

0.28

0.41

0.49

0.35

0.25
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Correlation and descriptive statistical analysis are conducted on the seven measures showed a
positive relationship as follows:


A significant correlation exist between ―Training staff to
ensure they have a clear understanding of what constitutes
error, fraud, and corruption” which tend to be paired with
higher scores on the other measure to establish “public
awareness campaigns to ensure beneficiaries and
community members understand how the program will
deter fraud and corruption”. This indicate that CCT programs
tend to train its staff on understanding what are EFC and as well
works on the second dimension which is public awareness.
From the data set, this might be considered one of the strategies
that commonly used in CCT. Many programs in Mexico, Brazil,
Philippines, El Salvador, and Egypt combined both measures as
effective measures to mitigate EFC in CCT programs.



The mean value of the above correlated measures shows that the
two measures are the most commonly used that describe
program tendency in using deterrence mechanisms in CCT
programs.



Also, an indication of significance correlation between the
measure of ―Putting in place strong criminal penalties for
fraudulent actions by program staff or beneficiaries” and its
relation to the other two measures; ―Strengthening laws and
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regulations that govern punishment for fraud or corruption
by program officials” and ―Strengthening laws and
regulations that govern punishment for fraud or corruption
by beneficiaries”
Although these measures were not supported by most of the surveyed countries but they have
significance correlation since they are all dealing with regulation and putting in place
accountability action toward EFC actions.

This could be explained in the context of countries that are old in implementing CCT like
Mexico and Brazil since those are the countries implementing these measures. For other
countries that are not using these measures , this could refer to lack of laws and regulations that
govern EFC in social protection programs, or it could be that they prefer not to use these
measures for policy reasons.
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Examining of measures that have been used to prevent EFC at eligibility stage Covered by
questions # 23
Under this section five measures to prevent EFC in CCT program at eligibility stage. The
following measures are used with high effectiveness to prevent CCT programs from EFC:
Figure 10: Preventive measures used at eligibility stage

Not used

120%

Was used and was Highly
effective

100%

Was used and Somewhat
effective

80%
60%

Was used with low level of
effectiveness

40%
20%

Was used but not effective
at all

Training for program staff
on mechanisms to prevent
error, fraud, and corruption

Use of IT systems in the
verification of proves of
eligibility against national
databases

Involvement of civil society
organizations in the
program design

Begin with a mapping of
the community

Design a stage of data
collection process to
identify cases

0%

Not sure/don’t know
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Table 3: Correlation analysis between prevention measures at eligibility stage
Prevention measures

Design
a stage
of data
collecti
on
proces
s to
identif
y cases

Begin
with a
mappin
g of the
commu
nity

Involvem
ent of
civil
society
organizati
ons in
the
program
design

Use of
IT
systems
in the
verificat
ion of
proves
of
eligibilit
y
against
national
database
s

Design a stage of data collection process to identify cases
Begin with a mapping of the community
Involvement of civil society organizations in the program design
Use of IT systems in the verification of proves of eligibility
against national databases
Training for program staff on mechanisms to prevent error,
fraud, and corruption

1
0.74
0.41
0.37

1
0.29
0.17

1
0.21

1

0.68

0.47

0.53

0.24
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“Design a stage of data collection process to identify cases”:
A high scored measure which heavily emphasis the importance
of the design phases when it comes to prevention. Also, a strong
significant correlation to ―mapping of the community” has
been proven the importance of the mapping to prevent from
errors of inclusion and exclusion of poor families into the
program.



“Begin with a mapping of the community”: This measure
used as highly effective measure and favored by most of the
participants which introduce an important role to the mapping of
community and identifying who should included and provide
maps for areas and families who deserve the program coverage.



“Use of IT systems in the verification of proves of eligibility
against national databases”: more than half of the respondents
confirmed the importance of using IT solutions in the
verification process , this is because experiments of those
countries shows how the use of IT solution in the verification is
highly effective and cost effective when used . Also, correlate to
design stage; this would facilitate use of IT since the early
phases.



“Training for program staff on mechanisms to prevent
error, fraud, and corruption”: This measure got high support
by respondents since training program staff is important to
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rationalize the investment in CCT. Program staff who got
training on what is considered error, fraud, and corruption has
more ability to succeed in their mission. Also, it has a strong
correlation to the measure of “design of data collection
process”. This correlation may refer to tendency of the program
administration to train program staff first on how to prevent
EFC actions, then how to identify them when happening. This
preventive mechanism of learning would support and set sense
of prevention inside program staff rather depending only on
setting only mechanisms of identifying EFC.
Table 4: Descriptive analysis of prevention measures at eligibility stage
Design a stage of
data collection
process to
identify cases

Mean
Median
Mode
Sum

3.88
5.00
5.00
128.00

Begin with a
mapping of the
community

Involvement of civil
society organizations
in the program
design

3.94
5.00
5.00
130.00

2.73
3.00
1.00
90.00

Use of IT systems in
the verification of
proves of eligibility
against national
databases
3.39
5.00
5.00
112.00

Training for program
staff on mechanisms to
prevent error, fraud,
and corruption

3.27
4.00
5.00
108.00

The mean value of the above first four measures shows that those measures are the most
commonly used ones among the programs surveyed for prevention mechanisms from EFC at
eligibility stage.
The fifth measure was used more rarely.


“Involvement of civil society organizations in the program
design”: have taken the least score by 24Percent said that it is
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used and highly effective, 24Percent used and somewhat
effective, and 27Percent confirmed it is not used.
The analysis of the prevention measures that was used in the eligibility stage showed that
most of these measures were used by CCT programs in Mexico, Brazil, El Salvador, and Egypt
to build a block to combat EFC at early stage of the program. This is less costly than trying to
defeat EFC in later stages and an effective method to ensure the proper procedure and capacity
are in place. The absence of such measures in early implementation phases would leave risks of
EFC unmanageable and put the program at high risk.

The comments that were made on preventive measures at eligibility stage by the
participants in the focus group discussion that was held with the local social workers could be
analyzed as follows:
 Measures need to be considered at eligibility stage and would help to reduce EFC:
Increase the role of social workers in determination of families‘ eligibility
―Although this is a very important measure, there is no consideration to social
workers inputs in the eligibility stage. His role is important since he is the most
capable person to describe families‘ social status‖
Social workers have seen that their inputs at eligibility stage should be added and have
reasonable weight in process of determining families‘ eligibility. This may add value since social
workers inputs is coming from real valuation to poor families status and judgment of whether
they really need to be covered by CCT program or not. This may raise the argument of cost
benefit analysis which will be discussed later in the research implication.
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Total number of people per room (crowding) criteria as one of
the major eligibility criteria needs reconsideration

―The crowding measure is not that important to be put in the first priority to choose the
eligible families. I will tell a lot about families who are not suffering from crowding but
so needy because they have ill family members or family members suffering from
chronic diseases‖
Social workers have seen that the crowding criteria should not take heavy weight in the
assessment process of families‘ eligibility. Social workers provided stories on one family who
tried to defraud their investigation of family social status during the visits by social workers to
determine whether families are eligible or not. The family invited their relatives to show that
they have crowding and have many children. On the second following visit, the real count of
family members was discovered and the family excluded from the list of potential families for
eligibility to CCT program.
The view of the social workers is that crowding is a valid measure but should have lower
weight compared to other standards. In addition, some poor families have no crowding and still
in position of being eligible due to their very low social status. The data collected from global
experts‘ surveys supports this view as the crowding criterion is only used in 28Percent vs. 72
Percent that are not using it along all the countries that have been surveyed.
On comparing the data obtained from global expert‘s visions about involving civil society
organization into the design stage, the data indicate that the Egyptian model does not involve
NGOs into the design stage. One possible reason is that in Egypt some NGOs may be subject to
a lot of conflict of interest or political pressure. It is believed by some of the participants that
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some NGOs can be used to pressure the poor to vote in support of certain political parties during
the election.
One of social workers provided that:
―Before involving civil society organization into the social protection programs, there
must be awareness session to Egyptian people on how to use their rights and how to deal
with the civil society organizations. Some civil society organizations try to pressure on
the poor for getting their votes before election by promising that they will provide them
with financial aid and Ramadan package (in-kind holy month package of sugar, food oil,
and other food items)‖
There is a higher possibility after the Egyptian revolution of January 25th of preventing political
intervention in the program design or in the determination of targeting. It is hoped that the
revolution will preserve the rights of all Egyptians to feel freedom when choosing their
representative and will provide mechanisms to prevent such political intervention.
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Examining of measures that have been used to detect EFC at eligibility stage Covered by
questions # 24
This section focuses on mechanisms of checks and balance, review of eligibility, and methods of
verification of information provided by participated families in the program.
Figure 11: Detection measures used at eligibility stage

Not used

Make thorough
cross-checks of
registries to detect
inconsistencies.

Recertify eligibility
periodically to
detect fraudulent
actions

To focus eligibility
checks on high-risk
groups

Systems to
facilitate data
matching of the
participant families
across different
data sources.

120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

Was used and was
Highly effective
Was used and
Somewhat effective
Was used with low level
of effectiveness
Was used but not
effective at all
Not sure/don’t know

Table 5: Descriptive analysis of detection measures at eligibility stage

Mean
Median
Mode
Sum

Systems to facilitate data
matching of the participant
families across different data
sources.

To focus eligibility
checks on highrisk groups

Recertify eligibility
periodically to detect
fraudulent actions

Make thorough cross-checks
of registries to detect
inconsistencies.

2.82
4.00
5.00
93.00

2.36
1.00
1.00
78.00

2.94
4.00
5.00
97.00

3.00
4.00
5.00
99.00
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Table 6: Correlation analysis between detection measures at eligibility stage
Systems to facilitate data
matching of the
participant families
across different data
sources.
1

To focus eligibility
checks on high-risk
groups

0.52

1

Recertify eligibility periodically
to detect fraudulent actions

0.38

0.51

1

Make thorough cross-checks of
registries to detect
inconsistencies.

0.53

0.55

0.49

Detection measures

Systems to facilitate data
matching of the participant
families across different data
sources.
To focus eligibility checks on
high-risk groups

Recertify
eligibility
periodically to
detect fraudulent
actions

Make thorough
cross-checks of
registries to
detect
inconsistencies.

1

Four measures are presented under this section and shows positive correlation as follows:


Although one third (33Percent) of respondents reported that the
measure of “To focus eligibility checks on high-risk groups”
was not used, it shows positive correlation with two other
measures: ―Recertify eligibility periodically to detect
fraudulent actions” and ―Make thorough cross-checks of
registries to detect inconsistencies”. This could be understood
in the context that the latter two measures would work to update
program with families‘ status, and detect any inconsistency in
families‘ records. Combining the use of the recertification of
families‘ eligibility besides the cross-checks of families registry
might be more likely to be in use by CCT program
administration because it is less costly than using eligibility

Page 85

`

checks on high-risk groups‘ mechanisms. “Make thorough
cross-checks of registries to detect inconsistencies”: This
measure has got the highest score by 46Percent as ―was used
and highly effective‖ measure and at same time has got the
highest mean which present a commonly applied measure to
detect EFC in eligibility stage.
Data collected from Focus Group discussion that was held with social workers in Egypt
confirmed that the pilot program in Egypt did not relay too much on using IT solutions to
detect any inconsistency in poor families‘ data. Also, this study recommended establishing
direct link between local social unit and government official database. Such link would
facilitate the work of social workers when verifying family‘s eligibility and detecting and
reporting any cases of incompliance to program conditionality.

Page 86

`

Examining of measures that have been used to prevent EFC at compliance to program
conditionality stage Covered by questions # 25
Figure 12: Preventive measures used at compliance stage

120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

Not used
Was used and was Highly
effective

Warning and
punishing health
workers who
provide wrong…

Warning and
punishing school
officials who
provide wrong…

Warning or
punishing of
families that bribe
program officials…

Determine the
nature of the
problems facing
families and…

Allocation of
Government interdepartmental
responsibilities

Was used and Somewhat
effective
Was used with low level of
effectiveness
Was used but not effective at
all
Not sure/don’t know

On this stage only two measures out of five were supported to prevent EFC at the compliance
stage. The first measure is ―Determine the nature of the problems facing families and
support the family” which scored by 47Percent as used and highly effective measure, whereas
the second measure ―Allocation of Government inter-departmental responsibilities” has got
average scoring as one of the prevention measures at compliance. Other measures were having
lower support by program mangers and consultants as an indication to that the program design is
not focusing on the prevention measures that set the involved parties accountable for their fraud
and corruption actions. Again, setting different parties accountable and punish them still not
supported by surveyed programs. Punishing lack support because it may be seen as a tool that
causes mistrust and fears from participated parties.
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Table 7: Descriptive analysis of prevention measures at compliance stage
Prevention measures at
compliance

Allocation of
Government interdepartmental
responsibilities

Allocation of
Government interdepartmental
responsibilities
Determine the nature of
the problems facing
families and support the
family
Warning or punishing of
families that bribe
program officials to
falsely confirm
compliance with program
conditionality
Warning and punishing
school officials who
provide wrong
compliance verification.
Warning and punishing
health workers who
provide wrong
compliance verification

1

Determine the nature of
the problems facing
families and support
the family

Warning or punishing
of families that bribe
program officials to
falsely confirm
compliance with
program conditionality

Warning and punishing
school officials who
provide wrong
compliance
verification.

0.56

1.00

0.63

0.39

1.00

0.63

0.40

0.89

1.00

0.62

0.42

0.89

0.99
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provide wrong
compliance verification
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The following measures achieved positive correlation since ―the determination of problems
faced by families” measure needs cooperation between ―inter-governmental units and
departments” in order to prevent falling into these problems and to solve then when they
happen.

Although the other three measures ―Warning or punishing of families that bribe
program officials to falsely confirm compliance with program conditionality”, “Warning
and punishing school officials who provide wrong compliance verification” , and “Warning
and punishing health workers who provide wrong compliance verification” in average
scored as ―Not used ―and ―low effective‖ , there is high significant correlation amongst those
measure and the allocation of inter- governmental and departmental responsibilities since
warning program officials , schools , and health officials needs clear allocation of intergovernmental responsibilities as pre-requisite to warning actions. In addition, if there is a willing
to be tougher enforcement, it will require more coordination between government and, as the
program may lack the appropriate authority.

Not only within the intergovernmental coordination is required but existence of political
support, up to the president, is a key factor to the success of the program because the
interministerial coordination, in large, are acting and interpreting the president‘s needs. Also,
establishment of an entity with sufficient power to coordinate the various participants in the
program, and the mechanism for controlling the program compliance verification is very crucial
to the success of the program. There may be set of incentives to coordinate and encourage the
cooperation between government officials, program officers, and
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Focus group discussion that was held with the local social workers in Egypt provided the
following on the prevention mechanisms of EFC in the compliance stage:


Social workers have seen that lack of cooperation and
coordination between inter-governmental units would led to
inefficiency in achieving the program goals



―We have faced difficulty with governmental units to cooperate
and provide the public services….when scaling the program
more cooperation and coordination is required as for the good of
the program future‖



There is a trend in the piloting project on avoiding threatening
families by punishments if they abide by the program rules.
Some of the participating families don‘t believe that there will
be punishments, and they have seen that applying terms of
social contract is limited to cutting the cash and terminate them
from the program.



The piloting program social workers provided that by
investigating of families failing to comply with program
conditionality, they may be more bale to understand and analyze
the reasons behind these withdrawals‘. Analyzing the reason
would help the social workers and program administrators to
understand whether the reasons related to program design or
conditionality and if related the program administrators could
work on improving the conditions that causes the problems.
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Examining of measures that have been used to detect EFC at compliance to program
conditionality stage Covered by questions # 26
Figure 13: Detection measures used at compliance stage

120%
100%

Not used

80%
Was used and was Highly
effective

60%
40%

Was used and Somewhat
effective

20%
Regular visits to
schools to monitor
children school…
Regular visits to
healthcare centers to
monitor children &…
Streamline of eligibility
determination and
related program rules…
Establish hotlines to
receive complaints of
families on non-…
If families refuse to
comply with conditions,
a family will be…
Make regular visits by
social workers to
facilitate and…
Sample selections of
cases for independent
monitoring of…
Cross-check of
compliance from
supplier of service

0%

Was used with low level of
effectiveness
Was used but not effective at all

Not sure/don’t know

Eight measures have been proven positive and significant correlated and achieved high scores as
in application measures with high effectiveness (ranged from 34.4Percent to 53.1. Percent ) .
Same measures have got high scores as they have been used and were somewhat effective
(ranged from 6Percent up to 19Percent). So, the detection measures are classified as high
category measures.
These results show that the detection measures at compliance stage have given more attention by
the CCT program administration at most of the globe than to prevention measures.
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Regular visits to schools to monitor
children school attendance

Cross-check of compliance
from supplier of service

Sample selections of cases
for independent monitoring
of outcomes to detect
problems

Make regular visits by social
workers to facilitate and
encourage family
compliance

If families refuse to comply
with conditions, a family
will be excluded from the
program

Establish hotlines to receive
complaints of families on
non-compliance issues

Streamline of eligibility
determination and related
program rules to reduce
level of ambiguity

Regular visits to healthcare
centers to monitor children
& family health checkup
records

Detection measures of compliance

Regular visits to schools to
monitor children school
attendance

Table 8: Correlation analysis between detection measures at compliance stage

1

Regular visits to healthcare centers to
monitor children & family health
checkup records
Streamline of eligibility determination and
related program rules to reduce level of
ambiguity
Establish hotlines to receive complaints of
families on non-compliance issues

0.62

1

0.36

0.45

1

0.30

0.46

0.58

1

If families refuse to comply with
conditions, a family will be excluded from
the program
Make regular visits by social workers to
facilitate and encourage family compliance

0.48

0.57

0.74

0.42

1

0.54

0.48

0.46

0.38

0.62

1

Sample selections of cases for independent
monitoring of outcomes to detect
problems
Cross-check of compliance from supplier
of service

0.52

0.48

0.55

0.44

0.59

0.48

1

0.40

0.39

0.52

0.52

0.35

0.41

0.37
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As per data obtained on the eight measures, there are more correlated measures some of which
are as follows:


“Regular visits by social workers to schools” correlated to
―regular visits to healthcare centers” since both are
complementing one another and reporting the progress that
children of poor families have for schooling and getting
healthcare services.



“Streamline eligibility rules to reduce ambiguity” strongly
correlated to ―families exclusion from the program whenever
non-compliance reported”. In this context, if the program
rules are clear and simple, it is easier to exclude families that do
not comply.



“If families refuse to comply with conditions, a family will
be excluded from the program” correlated to “Make regular
visits by social workers to facilitate and encourage family
compliance”. This indicates that social worker visits are being
used to give the families a chance to comply, but then those who
still do not comply are excluded.
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Table 9: Descriptive analysis of detection measures at compliance stage
Regular
visits to
schools to
monitor
children
school
attendance

Regular
visits to
healthcare
centers to
monitor
children
& family
health
checkup
records

Streamline of
eligibility
determination
and related
program rules
to reduce
level of
ambiguity

Establish
hotlines to
receive
complaints
of families
on noncompliance
issues

If families
refuse to
comply
with
conditions,
a family
will be
excluded
from the
program

Make
regular
visits by
social
workers to
facilitate
and
encourage
family
compliance

Sample
selections
of cases for
independent
monitoring
of
outcomes to
detect
problems

Crosscheck of
compliance
from
supplier of
service

Mean

2.42

3.24

3.27

2.88

3.61

2.88

2.42

2.61

Median

1.00

4.00

5.00

4.00

4.00

4.00

1.00

3.00

Mode

-

5.00

5.00

5.00

5.00

5.00

5.00

5.00

Sum

80.00

107.00

108.00

95.00

119.00

95.00

80.00

86.00

Detection
measures
of
compliance

Providing that this is the first time that a group of measures are almost indicated as used
and effective which probably could be translated into more interest by program administration to
focus on compliance stage, since that is an essential element of the program. The literature calls
attention to another aspect of the importance of detection measures, which is that some families
would try to provide fraudulent information on their compliance or involve program staff in
corrupt actions at this stage in order to move into the cash disbursing stage and get the money.

Focus group discussion with Egyptian social workers adds more clarification on this point as
follows:


The monthly visits helps to discover cases of fraud by
family on crowding, number of rooms, social status



The contract signed with families confirm that there will
be gradual deduction from cash transferred as one way
to penalize families that do not comply with program
conditionality
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Investigation of families‘ withdrawal reasons would help
to identify measures needed to strengthen the program,
such as a need to fill in missing services.
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Examining of measures that have been used to prevent EFC at cash disbursement stage Covered
by questions # 27
Figure 14: Preventive measures used at cash disbursing stage

120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

Not used
Was used and was Highly
effective

De-link cash
payments from
government and
program staff

Regular checks by
program
administration on
compliance before
cash disbursing,
rather than later in
the process

Direct payment to
program
beneficiaries
through direct bank
deposits

Was used and Somewhat
effective
Was used with low level of
effectiveness
Was used but not effective at all
Not sure/don’t know

This stage, which relates to whether respondents apply prevention measures at cash
disbursement stage, shows much more use of direct deposit method and on the other measure of
―Regular checks by program administration on compliance before cash disbursing, rather
than later in the process”, there is some favoring the ―use‖ of regular checks on the compliance
and others to provide that it is ―not using‖ for the same measure.
Due to its importance, the ―Direct payment to program beneficiaries through direct
bank deposits” measure scored 66Percent as ―used and highly effective‖. Additional 6 Percent
―somewhat effective use‖ compose larger support to using direct payment to beneficiaries‘
accounts. This is because cash in general considered one of the resources most subject to fraud,
and corruption actions; thus direct payment to beneficiaries‘ bank accounts better controls cash
disbursement stage in CCT program.
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Table 10: Descriptive analysis of prevention measures at cash disbursing stage
Prevention measures

Direct payment to program
beneficiaries through direct
bank deposits

Regular checks by
program administration
on compliance before
cash disbursing, rather
than later in the process

Direct payment to program beneficiaries
through direct bank deposits

1

Regular checks by program
administration on compliance before cash
disbursing, rather than later in the
process
De-link cash payments from government
and program staff

0.39

1

0.39

0.45

De-link cash
payments from
government and
program staff

1

There is positive correlation among the other three prevention measures. Apply the
measure of “Direct payment to program beneficiaries through direct bank deposits” reduces
the risk of fraud governmental official or post offices employees since it provide the cash
through secured channels to beneficiaries. In addition, it lowers the transaction cost in payment
process through reducing the total number of employees required to handle the cash to
beneficiaries.

The second measure of ―Regular checks by program administration on compliance
before cash disbursing, rather than later in the process” would support efforts to mitigate
error occurrence through the payment process and till it reached the beneficiaries. This would
work as filtration process to cases may not comply or involved in risks of providing wrong data
about their compliance, participated in fraud actions, or intentionally make corrupted actions.
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―De-link cash payments from government and program staff” is one of the crucial
measures to avoid fraud and corruption because the existence of intermediate person in the
payment process giving a chance for bribing or pay to ghost persons. Also, this measure is
considered an indicator on program quality in accuracy of processing and payments.
Examining of measures that have been used to detect EFC at cash disbursement stage Covered
by questions # 28

Figure 15: Detection measures used at cash disbursing stage

120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

Not used
Was used and was Highly
effective

Monitor uncollected
payments to gain
information on the…

Have national
accounts audited
by an external…

Reconcile payment
transfers with
actual payments …

Use national IDs in
verifying the
payment process…

Collaborate to
monitor cash flow
by involving…

Monitor reports of
ATM cards lost or
stolen as a signal…

Review of benefit
claims on
randomly, or risk…

Was used and Somewhat
effective
Was used with low level of
effectiveness
Was used but not effective at all
Not sure/don’t know

These groups of measures (seven measures) are applied in order to detect EFC at the cash
disbursing stage. On the top of the measures that were applied ―Use national IDs in
verifying the payment process to match data of beneficiaries and improve detection
efforts” by percentage of 56Percent , this is one of the most measures to verify the payment
process and investigate who gets what and how much money disbursed. There might be low
level of ATM‘s available everywhere, so that this may explain low use of automatic teller
machines in delivering the payment. Some countries, especially in South Africa, uses armed
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forces to protect cash vehicles while it moves between villages because lack of local banks or
post offices. Others use finger prints instead of ID‘s as method of verifying cash deliver by
using ATM‘s. One of the advanced features that were applied in CCT piloting project in
Egypt is the use of national IDs ―bitaqa‖ in the payment and verification process and use if
ATM‘s by poor families.

The following measures are applied and marked as used with high effectiveness:


Reconcile payment transfers with actual payments on a regular basis



Have national accounts audited by an external audit institution



Monitor uncollected payments to gain information on the quality of controls and
validate CCT cash payments



Collaborate to monitor cash flow by involving national and external audit units



Review of benefit claims on randomly, or risk basis

The above group of measures covers two types of detection strategies (The World Bank, 2010):
Intelligence: by empowering program staff to refer cases of EFC to specialized people
from independent audit bodies. Also, improve the joint effort with other governmental
units and ministries.
Investigation: by introducing cases of EFC to independent review that looks at all facets
of a case and provide recommendation that would support the program in designing
controls. As well, it introduces methodology to apply guidance to how to conduct
investigation on EFC indicators such monitoring un-collected cash.

Only two measures were used slightly and not used in large compared to other measures:
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Review of benefit claims on randomly, or risk basis; This
measure may not be used because it‘s costly to identify risk
groups and it needs more investment in IT solutions.



Monitor reports of ATM cards lost or stolen as a signal of
possible fraud; since its one of difficult measures to detect use
of ATM cards, 47Percent not use it at all and 20Percent use it
with high effective and somewhat effective. Also, missing of
collaboration among service providers of cash, such banks, and
program administration. Especially that bank doesn‘t involve
in transaction that may lead to disclose its customer‘s
confidentiality. Finally, this special arrangement may not be
applicable in some programs as it may be against law.

Correlation analysis provides that six out of the seven measures have positive significant correlation
and moving toward a control system to detect EFC at cash disbursing stage.
Table11: Correlation analysis between detection measures at cash disbursing stage
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Review of benefit claims on
randomly, or risk basis
Monitor reports of ATM
cards lost or stolen as a
signal of possible fraud
Collaborate to monitor cash
flow by involving national
and external audit units
Use national IDs in verifying
the payment process to
match data of beneficiaries
and improve detection
efforts
Reconcile payment transfers
with actual payments on a
regular basis
Have national accounts
audited by an external audit
institution
Monitor uncollected
payments to gain
information on the quality of
controls and validate CCT
cash payments

Monitor uncollected payments to gain
information on the quality of controls and
validate CCT cash payments

Have national accounts audited by an external
audit institution

Reconcile payment transfers with actual
payments on a regular basis

Use national IDs in verifying the payment
process to match data of beneficiaries and
improve detection efforts

Collaborate to monitor cash flow by involving
national and external audit units

Monitor reports of ATM cards lost or stolen as
a signal of possible fraud

Detection measures

Review of benefit claims on randomly, or risk
basis

`

1
0.60

1

0.43

0.38

1

0.54

0.26

0.66

1

0.46

0.28

0.57

0.29

1

0.37

0.16

0.55

0.41

0.56

1

0.35

0.32

0.58

0.42

0.59

0.29

1

It‘s worthy to note that the mean of the six measures are equally distributed and that refer
to equal tendency to use them all to detect and control EFC at the cash disbursing stage.

Cross-Tabbing analysis :
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A grouping to the participants according to their geographic area (Latin America‘s ,
Africa, Asia, and Europe countries) have been tested to make cross-tabbing analysis to check on
whether they may be variance application of control mechanisms according to the regions. It has
been found that the collected data points and variability within regions were not conducive to
reaching useful findings. Future studies with larger samples could explore these differences
further.
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Emailing program experts and scholars found to add useful information about EFC mitigation
methods that works. The following short messages have been received:

A few numbers of experts have been communicated through e-mails to enquire about common
types of errors, fraud, and corruption. Also, the emailing was enquiring about their personnel
visions on how to mitigate these types of risks. Some preferred to be anonyms and other
approves to prevail their identity. Their comments were valuable and useful to this research.

According to Professor (A), the common risks that may face CCT programs as follows:
―There are errors of under-inclusion where eligible people are not selected and errors of
over inclusion where non-poor households are selected. Selection involves three
activities: information about the program, eligibility tests, and registration. People who
should be included might not know about a program, or their may know but they believe
wrongly that they are not eligible or the test is applied wrongly by the program agency,
and they may know and know they are eligible but they are not able to register because
they don't have identity cards or other documentation or because they cannot reach the
registration location. I guess the most 'famous' cases are situations in which groups are
excluded because of racial, ethnic, gender or class actors. The best way of reducing error
is by acting on all three activities.‖

Professor (A) has an experience as Senior Researcher and Research Coordinator for Insecurity,
Risk and Vulnerability-Chronic Poverty Research Centre provided his experience on inclusion
and exclusion error since these types of errors commonly exist in CCT programs. Government
efforts to achieve transparency and facilitate issuing identification for poor families who do not
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have ID‘s will solve part of the program. Accurate targeting mechanisms and awareness sessions
on the program terms and conditions will also support the success of the program.

Professor (A) adds;
―Fraud arises because the program agencies have too much discretion in the management
of the program. The Unemployed Heads of Household Program in Argentina did not have
effective eligibility tests because of the emergency at the time in that country; however ex
post assessments suggested the program was reasonably well targeted…
The best way of dealing with fraud is to restrict the discretion of program agencies,
ensure processes are transparent, and the agencies are accountable‖.

Lessen the discretion in CCT program is discussed in many literature and discretion has been
consider as a reasons behind a higher level of fraudulent actions. Ensuring accountability to
program members (staff, beneficiaries, officials) will reduce fraud action. In addition,
transparency in targeting is a high priority for effective implementation.

Finally, Professor (A) concluded that:
―Corruption is unusual in cct‘s because transfers are fairly transparent and financial
controls make it harder to appropriate funds. Nevertheless it does happen at the local
level. Manipulation by beneficiaries to secure transfers or by program agencies to divert
funds is the main sources of corruption...
The best way of addressing corruption is to ensure financial control and supervision, do
random tests, and keep centralized lists of beneficiaries‖
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Another professor (B); added

―Error caused by poor work ethic, incompetence on job; fraud: by greed/corruption;
corruption: sudden access to funds not accessible under the former system‖

Professor (B) suggested that in order to avoid these types of risk there should be mechanisms that
work to instill a better work ethic among the program team.

Third, is Professor (C) who shares same causes of EFC with the other two professors:
―The causes of corruption in any CCT system always link to the same issue – that of
discretion (i.e. the ability to choose between individuals). As soon as you give discretion
to an individual to make decisions, no matter how tightly drawn your rules are, that
person will always be able to choose how to apply the rules. The official may then
receive money from an applicant, or may make a decision according to the political
allegiance of the applicant – so in many cases it is not poverty but ability to pay a bribe,
or hold the right political party card which makes the difference.‖

―Regarding fraud, any system which is conditional enables applicants to cheat the system.
We see this in the benefit system in the UK, where it has been impossible to eliminate
fraud – so people will claim unemployment benefit while having a job (or in some cases,
several jobs!). It is difficult to say how widespread this problem is in any country‖
Professor (C) sees the solution as follows
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―The most workable measure to mitigate errors as far as pensions goes is to have a
universal transfer. In other words everybody receives the pension, with age as the only
qualification. If the objection to this is that people who don‘t ―need‖ a pension will still
receive one, the government has the option of taxing the pensions of more wealthy
recipients. So poor people get 100Percent untaxed pensions, whereas the wealthiest pay
(for example) 90Percent tax on the pension.‖

―This system removes all discretion, except proof of age. It still has drawbacks,
especially in countries where older people do not have birth certificates. There are ways
round this – for example, HelpAge in some countries has assisted older people to get
recognition of their age from the law courts‖

Professor (C) summing up his vision on what are workable measures for CCT controls:
―So the most workable measure is (as always) to simplify the system. The more
complicated the system, the more you give opportunities for both officials and recipients
to break the rules. Even where they don‘t, systems with many rules are also more prone
to mistakes and inefficiencies. Universal systems are not perfect, but they do eliminate
many of the problems of conditional transfer.‖

Professor (D) introduces a very good equation for causes of fraud and corruption
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―The more discretion is, the more opportunity for fraud. And the amount of discretion is a
function of how clear the rules are, and how many people have decision-making power,
with respect to who does and does not become a beneficiary, how many people can get
access to the funds, and what kinds of controls there [are] on each of these points.
Unclear rules + many people able to make decisions about who becomes a
beneficiary + few controls to make sure rules are followed = lots of room for
discretion, which means the CCT program, will be used to reward political
allies/voters/cousins etc. Similarly, if funds are handled by many officials and controls
are weak, money will in all likelihood disappear.‖

Most of the provided mechanisms are justified by experts and scholars; however some of the
provided solution may not be applicable due to constrained funds or due to pre- requisite needs
of administration capacity or social considerations.
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CHAPTER SIX: Study Findings
The following findings were reached thorough examination and analysis of the previous
data and answer the main research and investigative sub-questions of this thesis. Also, other
findings of challenges that may face the implementation of conditional cash transfer on large
scales have been reached through a number of interviews and focus group discussions

Challenges facing implementation of CCT in Upper Egypt:
It should be noted that the challenges facing the CCT in Upper Egypt are differ from that in Ain
El-Serra due to the following factors::
o

Geographically: Ain El-Serra is a slum urban area, whereas in Upper Egypt the program
is targeting 65 villages located in rural areas.

o

Identification of poor areas: in Ain El-Serra it was much easier than in Upper Egypt
because the poor slum areas in greater Cairo had already been identified by a
Geographical and Information System (GIS) study by Dr.Zinab Khedr while in upper
Egypt there was not easy to identify boundaries of areas suffering from poverty, which is
widespread throughout upper Egypt (El Saadany, 2011).

Political Challenges:
As noted in the Egyptian context, some policy makers may resist geographical targeting set by
the government and put pressure in favor of some villages that are located outside the target area
but inside their parliamentary district. (A: field work expert, 2010).

Economic Challenges:
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The opportunity cost for families to send their children to schools and have health
checkups for their children should be equal to or less than zero when compared to sending
children to work; otherwise those families will compare between the amount of cash transfer and
the amount of wages which their children could earn if they work. Unless there are other points
of attraction to families who see that educating their children and keeping them healthy is worth
the sacrifice of income from work, families will choose not to participate. So, the idea is to
incentivize families to pay for short term high opportunity cost and long term financial benefits
of educate their children.
Administration Challenges:
One of the challenges that face CCT implementation in Egypt is that to train social
workers on how to contact poor families, explain the CCT program terms and its goals, and
encourage them to participate in the program. To do that, it is important to understand the poor
family‘s needs, direct those families to service providers, and encourage families to use their
rights to get the services.
Improving wellbeing of families with regards to access to education, health, and nutrition
is one of the strong challenges to social workers. (Sholakamy, Piloting CCT in Egypt, 2010).
Fiscal pressures prevent increasing the number of social workers, and thus may limit their ability
to reach all eligible beneficiaries and to offer adequate counseling and follow up on the services
provided to the recipients.
The need for monitoring, performance benchmarking, and stakeholder consultations is
very important to implement CCT program in Egypt. To protect for Error, Fraud, and Corruption
(EFC), there should be tightened polices and procedure, policy for monitoring, evaluation, and
correction separated from the responsibilities for delivery of cash and services to protect from
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corruption, setting and clarification of fraud detection system to discover beneficiary or staff
fraud, and ensure that there is a solid process audit to protect from errors (Dennis, 2010).

Examination of control mechanisms provided by global experts:
Upon examination of the data obtained on control and accountability mechanisms used
by CCT program experts, and after analyzing the correlation between those measures, the
following major findings were reached on Prevention, Detection, and Deterrence mechanisms:

Prevention measures
These groups of measures were used successfully in the three stages. Most of the
emphasis in prevention of benefit fraud and error in CCT programs is placed on the
following:


Design a stage of data collection process to identify
cases



Begin with a mapping of the community



Involve civil society organizations in the program
design



Use IT systems in the verification of proof of eligibility
against national databases



Train program staff on mechanisms to prevent error,
fraud, and corruption



Allocate Government inter-departmental
responsibilities
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Determine the nature of the problems facing families
and support the families



Direct payments to program beneficiaries through
direct bank deposits



Make regular checks by program administration on
compliance before cash disbursing, rather than later in
the process



De-link cash payments from government and program
staff

Feedback obtained from focus group discussions with local social workers in Egypt,
indicated that there is lack of sufficient cooperation with regard to education and health services
for children and poor families, making support to families and follow-up on conditionality more
difficult.

On the focus group discussion: although the social workers agreed on the importance of
most of the above measures of preventions, they raised objections to involving civil society
organization in the designing of eligibility criteria as preventive action against EFC. Their
concern is that some of civil society organizations in Egypt have it own goals that may not be
aligned with those goals of CCT program. Also, may open doors for more discretion in the
program as they will judge on families‘ eligibility.
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Less extensive emphasis has been given to the following measures to strengthen prevention of
EFC:
a)

Warning or punishing of families that bribe program officials to falsely
confirm compliance with program conditionality

b)

Warning and punishing school officials who provide wrong compliance
verification.

c)

Warning and punishing health workers who provide wrong compliance
verification

The above measures have been added by this study to the World Bank toolkit to control EFC in
CCT programs as an additive to World Bank application to see whether it could work

This is one of the important findings of this study. The success of CCT program to
achieve its main goals, as discussed earlier, depends to large extent on the coordination and clear
lines of authority and accountability between institutions providing such services.
Considerations to control error may be differ from those for fraud and corruption; for example
the actions that include error might be avoided by implementing simple administration
prevention measures while fraud and corruption may require more structured measures and more
verification actions.

Preventive measures in the long run have a low cost in terms of resources and efforts as
they protect the program from leakage in public resources. For instance preventive measures of
direct cash payments to beneficiaries reduce errors when processing cash.
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Training program staff members on how to identify EFC is a very important tool to
reduce error, fraud, and corruption and it would help staff to do better job.
The study finds that, although the CCT program in Egypt has only been launched in a pilot
version, there will be a need in future expansions o f the program for more attention to
communication and enforcement of the cooperation protocol to organize cooperation between
CCT program administration with Ministry Of Education and Ministry Of Health.

Detection measures
Most of which were used successfully in the three stages. The main detection
activities that were used by CCT programs are as follows:


Implement systems to facilitate data matching of the
participant families across different data sources.



Recertify eligibility periodically to detect fraudulent
actions



Make thorough cross-checks of registries to detect
inconsistencies.



Make regular visits to schools to monitor children
school attendance



Make regular visits to healthcare centers to monitor
children and family health checkup records



Establish hotlines to receive complaints of families on
non-compliance issues
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Streamline eligibility determination and related
program rules to reduce level of ambiguity



Exclude families from the program if they refuse to
comply with conditions



Make regular visits by social workers to facilitate and
encourage family compliance



Select a sample of cases for independent monitoring of
outcomes to detect problems



Cross-check compliance with suppliers of service



Collaborate to monitor cash flow by involving national
and external audit units



Use national IDs in verifying the payment process to
match data of beneficiaries and improve detection
efforts



Reconcile payment transfers with actual payments on a
regular basis



Have national accounts audited by an external audit
institution



Monitor uncollected payments to gain information on
the quality of controls and validate CCT cash payments

Two other measures were not supported by the respondents:
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a)

Focus eligibility checks on high-risk groups: It may be that this step is
technically difficult to apply since identification of high risk groups (risk
profiling) within highly dispersed communities is a difficult process and needs
considerable resources in the field.

b)

Monitor reports of ATM cards lost or stolen as a signal of possible fraud: It
may be difficult to implement since it needs special arrangement with banks and,
in any case, it is not applicable in all programs and may not match local laws and
regulations.

c)

Review benefit claims on random or risk basis: 35Percent responded that this
measure is not used, while 37Percent applied this measure and 28Percent did not
know about it.
The above measure has been added by this study to the World Bank toolkit to
control EFC in CCT programs as an additive to WB application to test whether it
could work

There may be different reasons for that that may require more investigation in future studies.
Data matching measures, investigation measures, and IT and intelligent solutions are all effective
measures as provided by experts. These measures will have a variety of mechanisms to create
standards and tools of investigation to detect EFC and also strengthen the accountability within a
program.

Deterrence measures
The data obtained from the global experts provided that the sanctions that are used
against those who obtain benefits fraudulently are limited. They reported less effort was
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directed to penalize the fraud and corruption actions performed by program participants,
school officials, and health workers.
Most of the deterrence actions directed by the program managers to:


Train staff to ensure they have a clear understanding of
what constitutes error, fraud, and corruption



Establish public awareness campaigns to ensure
beneficiaries and community members understand how
the program will deter fraud and corruption



Use administrative penalties or formal cautions directed
to school officials who provide incorrect compliance
reporting.

The literature calls that the benefit offices will seek to recover the overpayments identified
through the courts without an additional penalty or fine.

The related practice, working to strengthen laws and regulations to govern punishments
for fraud and corruption actions, was given low scores, either not used or not identified or
known. Other measures that have low scoring as follows:
 Putting in place strong criminal penalties for fraudulent
actions by program staff or beneficiaries
 Strengthening laws and regulations that govern punishment
for fraud or corruption by program officials
 Strengthening laws and regulations that govern punishment
for fraud or corruption by beneficiaries
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 Use administrative penalties or formal cautions directed to
school officials who provide incorrect compliance
It is quite possible that these measures have low scores and the program managers chose
not to include sanctions because they thought it would scare some people away or lead to
dishonesty, rather than more compliance.
The above measures have been added by this study to the World Bank toolkit to control
EFC in CCT programs as an additive to WB application to determine whether they are
being used and what are the results.

The data obtained from focus group discussion confirmed this result. There is an
absence of clear legal definitions on what constitute fraud, error, and corruption in the social
protection system in Egypt. Thus, there is a limited legal base from which to apply
sanctions. In addition, the social protection programs have not taken actions against
employees or beneficiaries, who have taken benefits by fraud or corruption actions.

In general, most country programs do not use severe sanctions and increased
levels of prosecutions as a deterrent. There might be variety of reasons on why program
administration is not for the use of sanction measures; program managers don‘t use it to gain
more level of trust of participated families in the program. Also, families‘ heads may not
participate in the program as they have seen potential risks on their family members.
When comparing the findings of this study with that of World Bank toolkit (Van Stolk,
2010), it was found that global practice is generally in line with the recommended measures
for controlling error, fraud, and corruption in CCT programs.
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The study findings agrees with the World Bank finding that very limited use of
deterrence is observed with program administrators being reluctant to apply sanctions to
fraudulent claims. The deterrence measures that penalize fraud/ corruption by beneficiaries
and/or officials are not used in an assertive way. Without consideration of clear definition of
fraud actions in social security programs there will be little legal actions toward those
participated in fraud and/or corruption actions, and this would affect trust of the participants
and staff in the program and their willingness to be honest with each other and with the
program management as well. To sum, legal definitions of fraud needs to be aligned with
the program policy to mitigate EFC.

Positive trends on prevention, detection, and deterrence have been emerged from
the respondents on the use of more advanced verifications tools, awareness sessions, and use
of IT solutions, cross-checks and direct payment methods. All of these measures support
good systems to prevent EFC from happening.

Additional findings include proposed measures by this study on prevention,
detection, and deterrence measures. The proposed measures especially those related to
penalties, punishments to fraud, corruption actions may not be applicable to the context of
the countries covered in this research, and however they may be useful in other context such
in Egypt.
Feedbacks from local social workers in Egypt provide that there may be needs for such laws
or regulation especially when scaling up the program. This study supports this view and
recommends using these measures based on other countries experiences.
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As presented in the data analysis, the data collected on measures of prevention
and deterrence of both eligibility and compliance answer the first sub-question; what are the
administrative systems that would comprise a good implementation of conditional cash
transfer in Egypt? The measures of prevention and deterrence of cash disbursing answer the
second sub-question; what are the financial and control systems that would maximize and
provide the best basis of conditional cash transfer in Egypt?

The previously mentioned findings therefore provide an answer to the study‘s
main research question. Based on the data provided from the sample of global experts and
Egyptian social workers, the prevention, detection, and deterrence measures compose a
control system that mitigates risks of error, fraud, and corruption when implementing
conditional cash transfer systems.

Finally, the results of this study can be applied to CCT program in Egypt. These
controls could work in Egypt as they were used successfully in other countries‘ programs,
especially given that there are no local laws or regulations that contradict these measures.
This research cannot say, however, that these findings apply to all other CCT programs,
because there may be some measure that would not work in different contexts or might not
fit with laws and regulation in other countries. Moreover, although there might be an
underlying assumption that the CCT context everywhere is quite similar and therefore the
controls suggested would apply, the specific context for error, fraud, corruption actions may
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differ. Additionally, it would be preferable to repeat the survey with a larger sample than
was feasible within the time and resource constraints faced by the author.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Implications of the Findings and Recommendations
The successful implementation of CCT programs depends to large degree on the control
mechanisms applied to avoid error, fraud, and corruption. These in turn depend primarily on
improving the institutional capacity of programs that serve poor communities. The findings of
this research agree with those recommendations of the World Bank toolkit to control error, fraud,
and corruption in CCT programs. This finding supports the study goal of identifying a proper
control system that is in application in order to use it for CCT program in Egypt. It also finds that
not all of the recommended measures are in application. The reasons behind this may need
additional analysis and investigations to find why these controls are not in place.

Under this chapter, two sections will deal with the study implications and recommendations:
First section will deal with general recommendations on control mechanisms to mitigate EFC.
Second section will introduce what Egypt should learn from global experiences?
General recommendation on control mechanisms to mitigate EFC:

Introducing recommendations on measures to mitigate EFC is very important to reduce
leakage of public resources. The provided findings introduce useful information about measures
that are in fact applied. Some of these measures put on the top by majority surveyed, especially
those measures of prevention at eligibility and cash disbursement. Also, the high support by the
surveyed to detection measures at compliance stage, since it is very important at this stage to
detect families compliance to program conditionality to determine whether they will continue
and passed to cash disbursing or not. Generally, it is important to keep the country context in
mind.
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According to the World Bank toolkit, any recommendation for improvement needs to pass
the test of feasibility, suitability, and acceptability. In other words:
• How feasible is a recommendation given the institutional architecture and administrative
capacity of the country;
• How suitable or effective are the actions to address the particular EFC problem; and
• How acceptable are these actions likely to be to policy-makers, administrators, the
claimants and wider stakeholders?
These three filters are important as ‗good practice‘ is only relevant if it can be applied and
effective in tackling the EFC problem.
The measures provided in this research are useful for programs with complex eligibility
criteria where there is more intend to have higher levels of EFC. Also, the research worked on
programs that lack of comprehensive strategy to reduce EFC i.e. focus on some control
mechanisms and missing other controls. The research looks at administrative capacity since it is
very crucial to the program successful implementation. The capacity has number of aspects that
are considered when introducing control measures like Staff training, mapping the community,
and consider design stage to identify cases of EFC. Furthermore, use of IT to verify eligibility is
part of the program administrative capacity and helped in most of the surveyed countries to
reduce EFC.
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What Egypt should learn from global experiences?
The details obtained from local social workers in Egypt demonstrated that there is a need
to consider the social worker inputs in the determination of poor families‘ eligibility. They have
confronted the discussion that, in future, the program eligibility criteria should include section
for social worker input when determining poor families‘ eligibility. This would balance between
the current eligibility criteria that focus on community mapping plus other characteristics without
social workers‘ inspection criteria to define eligible families. On this point different arguments
by program experts who strongly advise against this. This is exactly the ―discretion‖ that is
identified as a source of corruption by some experts.
In addition, this study supported that there is no way to balance between social workers
request as to include their inputs in eligibility criteria and costs associated with this option such
adding supervisor‘s oversight. It will just add to cost of screening, and not necessarily reduce
corruption. The real need is to balance the simplicity of the criteria with the problem of
excluding needy families. Also, adding social workers inputs will add discretion to the program
as for identifying families‘ eligibility.
The co-operation between program administration and governmental institutions,
especially those providing health and education services, will facilitate the program mission.
Without this co-operation and co-ordination the program would lose public resources with lower
achievement of its main goals. For this reason, when scaling the program up in Egypt,
enforcement of such co-operation through regulations and protocols is a must in order to reach
desired goals. Findings on this point show a need for interministerial cooperation between
governmental units where additional and official protocols are needed.
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Also, a political support of the coordination will improve the process since all the
governmental units will seek to support the program whenever it has a high degree of support
from politicians. This wiling of cooperation supported the CCT program in Mexico when the
support was coming from the president himself (Santiago Levy, 2006)
Some consideration to eligibility criteria need to be considered when scaling up CCT in
future in Egypt. Adding child labor in the criteria since it is one of CCT program main goals is to
educate poor families‘ children and encourage poor families to send their children to schools.
Although this is one of CCT main goals, it is not taken into consideration in the eligibility
criteria and it should be included as a sign of poverty.
Re-consideration of eligibility criteria is recommended. For example, crowding as one of
the already exists criteria need to be re-considered when determine the families‘ eligibility in
CCT program. International experts and local social workers have given different examples for
families excluded from the program because they do not meet the crowding criteria but meet all
the other eligibility tests.
The use of computerized systems by the program in verifying data and processing data
matching measures would support program administration in detection of EFC actions.
Improvements in technology and using application of new technologies in terms of
communicating with the public, processing of benefits, making payments to beneficiaries, and
matching data would largely improve the mechanisms of controls and would also benefit the
program administration of the beneficiary data management. Literature on this point refer to that
the investment in IT solutions over time compensated through reduction in public resources
saved through EFC reduction.
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Other challenges to CCT programs, as discussed previously in the literature, and in study
findings include political, administrative, and economic challenges. These challenges may be
improved and even work in favor of poor families and program administration if there is good
implementation of the CCT control mechanisms introduced in this research. Control mechanisms
on EFC would improve CCT capacity to direct the program resources to target the poor and work
on improving their economic, educational, and health status. These considerations needs more
work and studies to evaluate the impact of CCT controls on these challenges.
Implication on future research includes methods to measure volume of error, fraud, and
corruption in CCT programs. A mechanism to measure the level of EFC would facilitate the
comparison between different programs in level of EFC and would help to direct efforts to areas
where risk of EFC is high in terms of cost and severity. The scope of future studies could also
cover how CCT control mechanisms impact the poor families‘ consumption level of program
public services. Do control mechanisms increase poor families‘ consumption of health services
or vice versa? How can CCT controls encourage poor families to believe that they have the rights
to get the governmental services instead of being a passive recipient?
This gives rise to other important research questions that could be explored in future
studies including: what are the specific barriers facing CCT implementation in Egypt? How do
existing policies, rules and procedures limit their success? What policy efforts are being made to
overcome such barriers and what facilities exist to help CCT program administration to
overcome such barriers? A final important question to address is whether differences between
programs in maturity, number of beneficiaries, and budget affect efficiency of the proposed CCT
control mechanisms?
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Some of the recommendations of this study indicate that a future study can be done
adopting a different sampling technique that would be based on larger total number of
respondents. This would better allow for generalization on a larger scale. Better access to
information can also allow for a more representative sample size to be drawn based on the total
population figures needed. The scope of this study could also be either expanded within the CCT
program that is going to be implemented in Upper Egypt on larger scale, or applied when
designing programs in other countries, taking into consideration their individual characteristics.
For example, some countries may already have in place a strong system of general systematic
control mechanisms and would not need to introduce as many CCT-specific measures. Further
study on these issues could allow us to generalize the results or provide more insights on how
EFC controls can influence program outcomes.

In conclusion the following chart summarizes the recommended mechanisms that
constitute a proper control system that could be implemented in CCT program in Egypt.
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Figure 16: What constitute a proper control system to mitigate EFC in the implementation of CCT
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Summary and Conclusion
Several studies indicate the positive impact of CCT programs on poverty reduction,
especially when incorporating health and education considerations. The main goal of CCT
programs is to provide social protection to poor families who are trapped in the cycle of poverty.

As indicated earlier in the introduction of this research, CCT programs can consume a
large amount of public resources. In addition, implementation of CCT programs includes various
types of risk: risk of error, risk of fraud, and risk of corruption. These types of risks represent
causes of the leakage of the CCT programs resources. In order to avoid risks of EFC and run an
effective CCT programs, issues of controls must be associated with CCT programs
implementation. Implementing accountability and control systems cannot completely eliminate
EFC risks, since there is no system immune from EFC, but it would help to reduce level of EFC
at CCT program stages.

This research has addressed ways to control the risks associated with error, fraud, and
corruption facing global CCT programs and identified successful mechanisms that were
recommended by international organization to mitigate those risks. Specifically, this research has
clarified the practices actually used in global CCT programs to reduce level of EFC in CCT
programs. This information enriches our understanding of such measures and how they can
strengthen CCT programs, including those in Egypt, since new programs need to benefit from
other countries‘ experiences before moving forward to scale up CCT.
The research has found varying levels of application of the tools recommended to mitigate EFC
introduced in the World Bank toolkit released in 2010. The research both clarifies which tools
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are in use and the degree of effectiveness as assessed by experts in the field in order to answer
the central research question: what constitutes a proper control system in implementing CCT
program to reduce the risks of EFC?
In this research different methods of data collection have been used to examine the use of
mechanisms at each of the program‘s three stages of eligibility, compliance to conditionality, and
cash disbursing so as to mitigate risks of EFC. The data collected on these control mechanisms
shows variety and preferences of tools and controls used in CCT programs; some of which were
more effective in the view of practitioners, while others were not used at all. Then, in the data
analysis section, the mechanisms are classified and grouped into three groups: mechanisms used
to prevent EFC, mechanisms to detect EFC, and mechanisms to deter EFC in CCT programs.

Although the dataset is of limited size, it nonetheless provides valuable information on
the actual field practice in the application of control mechanisms in CCT programs.

In the findings section of this research, different mitigation strategies were discussed,
based on those in application in the majority of implemented CCT programs
The finding shows that deterrence strategies to discourage EFC actions are not in place.
Little of developed countries apply sanctions since they have clear legal definitions of what
constitute EFC. Deterrence actions related to criminalizing fraud actions or penalizing program
staff for fraud or corruption are not in use except administrative penalties. Being in early phases
of CCT could explain why CCT program administration don‘t want to discourage families to
participate in the program be enforcing criminal penalties by law when discovering EFC but in
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the matured program such in Latin America, there is no clear reason behind freezing such
penalties. When households do not initially perceive that being involved in EFC would put them
in jail may encourage them to involve in such action since the penalty is limited to deduction of
amount of cash or termination from the program.
Study finding from focus group discussion with Egyptian social workers participated in
piloting of CCT program in Egypt; bring more attention to intergovernmental co-ordination In
CCT program. There is lack of clear protocol enforcing this coordination among different parties
MOE, MOH, and Program administration that represent MOSS. Without an enforcement of
coordination, CCT program will be a program of financial assistance rather introducing package
of services to enhance the educational and health status of the poor. In addition, the quality of
services introduced to poor families should have more studies to ensure it supports program
goals. Level of quality needs to be addressed to ensure that children are learning important skills
in critical thinking and creative process learning which are necessary for success in much higher
income occupations.

To conclude, the goal of this study is to introduce proper control system that could be
part of the success factor of CCT implementation. At the first sight, successful experience of
Latin American countries to implement control measures to mitigate EFC might seem to be a
good example to follow. As well the provided for toolkit tackling EFC is very useful. However,
it would be extremely challenging if not impossible to apply Latin American and World Bank
experience to Egyptian context. First of all, important consideration in the Egyptian governments
should be given to its capability to deliver governmental services. Administration capacity of the
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program to deliver good design of the program where transparency and methods of verification is
valid. Other mechanisms for monitoring and oversight are definitely required.
Another important reason is that program administration and scaling up any program
requires large amount of resources, especially as the literatures indicates that as much as 20
percent of monies allotted to conditional cash transfers must be reserved for administrative cost.
This cost may reach higher than the 20Percent due to weaknesses in the program administrative
and financial controls. Therefore, if considered the question of effectiveness in program
administration though control mechanisms still needs more thorough evaluation of what can be
done to increase efficiency and effectiveness.
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Appendix 1 _Thesis_questionnaire_ global experts
A. Introduction
This questionnaire is part of my thesis work on Cash Transfer Programs at American University
in Cairo- Egypt. The questionnaire addresses preventive mechanisms on the overflow of work of
the implementation of CCT programs. Its purpose is to provide guidance to the implementation
of CCT in Egypt and to support the researcher’s thesis work. The questionnaire focuses on
mechanisms applied during each of the three basic stages in the implementation of conditional
cash transfer at the local level:
I.
II.
III.

Determination of family eligibility
Determination of compliance with conditionality requirements
Cash disbursement

I would appreciate if you would take time to fill out the survey below; your feedback is valuable
to me and to my research outputs.
When answering the questionnaire, you are asked to provide information based on your
experience and knowledge to the best of your ability.
B. Privacy Statement:
All answers and information given will remain private. No names of individuals or identifying
information will appear in the resulting research report. All data collected will be maintained
separate from identifying information to preserve individual confidentiality. No risks of
participating in this study have been identified. We very much appreciate your assistance in
helping Egypt to develop an effective CCT program.

For further follow up please contact:
American University in Cairo - School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
Ahmed Fathy Badawy
Mobile: 010-1640872
Due to time constraints, kindly send responses in electronic format no later than 30th of May,
2011 to:
E-mail: a_fathy@aucegypt.edu
I appreciate if you allow me to send you a reminder on your feedback to my questionaire’s
Kindly naswer the follwoing quesitons:
 Section A : Respondant Background characteristics


Your Gender :
o Male
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o Female


Your Age:
o 25-35
o 35-45
o 45-55
o 55-65
o Over 65



You experienced CCT through which of the following activities:
o
o
o
o
o
o

Donor
Implementor :– Management activities
Implementor :– Admin. & Finance activities
Conducting Field Work
Consulting
Other, please fill in the space (---------------------)



Your Title: please specify: (--------------------------------------------------------------------)



Your role on the process : please specify (---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------)

 Section B: Program Background charcterisitcs


Country of implementation: (-------------------------)



How many phases the paorgram has taken for implementation, please specify (----------------------)



Area in which the CCT program is implmented
o Rural area
o Urban area
o Both in Rural and Urban



Total number of beneficiery household covered by the program (ranges)
o
o
o
o
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Less than half million beneficiery
A million of beneficiries
Two million benefciery
More than three million beneficiery

 Section C: Was any of the following program eligibility criteria used?
1.
o
o

dwelling unit size / number of rooms
Yes
No

2.

If yes, what was the criterion? Please specify (--------------)

3.
o
o

Number of people per room (crowding)
Yes
No

4.
o
o

Marital status of the household
Yes
No

5.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

If yes, select from the following
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Never married
Sparated

6.
o
o

Whther a family has children less than 18 years of age
Yes
No

7.
o
o

Whther any of the houshold head has a health burden
Yes
No

8.
o
o

Whther houshold head is working ?
Yes
No

9.
o
o

Whther there is a social security received by houshold
Yes
No

10. Was there an accessibility of the houshold to socail protection schemes
o Has access to pension schemes for the poor
o Has no access to pension schemes for the poor
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11. Whther the family has child labor
o Yes
o No
12. If you have other innovative eligibility criteria, please specify (--------,----------------,---------------,----)



Section D : please select the best answer for the following questions:

Not
used

Group 1 : Eligibility
1

1-1

1-2

1-3

1-4

1-5

1-6

1

Was
used
and
was
Highly
effectiv
e
5

Was used
and
Somewhat
effective

4

Was
used
with
low
level of
effective
ness
3

Was
used
but not
effectiv
e at all

Not
sure/
don’t
know

2

0

In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to discourage error, fraud,
and corruption in CCT programs?
Training staff to ensure they have a
clear understanding of what
constitutes error, fraud, and corruption
Putting in place strong criminal
penalties for fraudulent actions by
program staff or beneficiaries
Strengthening laws and regulations
that govern punishment for fraud or
corruption by beneficiaries
Strengthening laws and regulations
that govern punishment for fraud or
corruption by program officials
Establish public awareness campaigns
to ensure beneficiaries and community
members understand how the program
will deter fraud and corruption
Use administrative penalties or formal
cautions directed to clients who
provide incorrect compliance
information.
Page | 4

1-7

Use administrative penalties or formal
cautions directed to school officials
who provide incorrect compliance

2

In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to prevent error, fraud, and
corruption at the eligibility stage?
2-1 Design a stage of data collection
process to identify cases
2-2 Begin with a mapping of the
community
2-3 Involvement of civil society
organizations in the program design
2-4 Use of IT systems in the verification
of proves of eligibility against national
databases
2-5 Training for program staff on
mechanisms to prevent error, fraud,
and corruption
3
3-1

3-2
3-3
3-4

In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to detect error, fraud, and
corruption at the eligibility stage?
Systems to facilitate data matching of
the participant families across
different data sources.
To focus eligibility checks on highrisk groups
Recertify eligibility periodically to
detect fraudulent actions
Make thorough cross-checks of
registries to detect inconsistencies.

Group II : Compliance to conditionality during the program
1
1-1
1-2
1-3

1-4

In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to prevent error, fraud, and
corruption at the compliance stage?
Allocation of Government interdepartmental responsibilities
Determine the nature of the problems
facing families and support the family
Warning or punishing of families that
bribe program officials to falsely
confirm compliance with program
conditionality
Warning and punishing school
officials who provide wrong
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1-5

2
2-1
2-2

2-3

2-4

2-5

2-6

2-7

2-8

compliance verification.
Warning and punishing health workers
who provide wrong compliance
verification.
In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to detect error, fraud, and
corruption at the compliance stage?
Regular visits to schools to monitor
children school attendance
Regular visits to healthcare centers to
monitor children & family health
checkup records
Streamline of eligibility determination
and related program rules to reduce
level of ambiguity
Establish hotlines to receive
complaints of families on noncompliance issues
If families refuse to comply with
conditions, a family will be excluded
from the program
Make regular visits by social workers
to facilitate and encourage family
compliance
Sample selections of cases for
independent monitoring of outcomes
to detect problems
Cross-check of compliance from
supplier of service

Group III : Cash disbursement methods
1
1-1

1-2

1-3

In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to prevent error, fraud, and
corruption at the cash disbursement stage?
Direct payment to program
beneficiaries through direct bank
deposits
Regular checks by program
administration on compliance before
cash disbursing, rather than later in
the process
De-link cash payments from
government and program staff
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2

In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to detect error, fraud, and
corruption at the cash disbursement stage? ?

2-1

Review of benefit claims on
randomly, or risk basis
Monitor reports of ATM cards lost or
stolen as a signal of possible fraud
Collaborate to monitor cash flow by
involving national and external audit
units
Use national IDs in verifying the
payment process to match data of
beneficiaries and improve detection
efforts
Reconcile payment transfers with
actual payments on a regular basis
Have national accounts audited by an
external audit institution
Monitor uncollected payments to gain
information on the quality of controls
and validate CCT cash payments

2-2
2-3

2-4

2-5
2-6
2-7
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Appendix 2_Thesis_questionnaire_field_workers
A. Introduction
This questionnaire is part of my thesis work on Cash Transfer Programs at American University
in Cairo- Egypt . It addresses preventive mechanisms on the overflow of work of the
implementation of CCT programs. The questionnaire focuses on mechanisms applied during
each of the three basic stages in the implementation of conditional cash transfer at the local level:
I.
II.
III.

Determination of family eligibility
Determination of compliance with conditionality requirements
Cash disbursement

When answering the questionnaire, you are asked to provide information based on your
experience and knowledge to the best of your ability.

B. How to answer the questionnaire
When answering the questionnaire, you are asked to provide your views on how best to
implement conditional cash transfer programs in Egypt in the future on a larger scale, based on
the experience in the pilot project, your professional knowledge, and to the best of your ability.
On the following pages is a list of items that may be used to support a good system to implement
CCT program. This is not a test of your knowledge or an assessment of the pilot program. It
simply asks you for your advice on how to implement a good control system in the future, based
on your knowledge of these programs and your knowledge of Egypt.
C. Time Allocation:
Please allot 20 minutes for answering this questionnaire.
D. Privacy Statement:
All answers and information given will remain private. No names of individuals or identifying
information will appear in the resulting research report. All data collected will be maintained
separate from identifying information to preserve individual confidentiality. No risks of
participating in this study have been identified. We very much appreciate your assistance in
helping Egypt to develop an effective CCT program. No information on your individual
answers, your name, or contact information will be provided to anyone for any purpose.

E. DIRECTIONS:
i.

READ each item carefully.

ii.

THINK about different measures described by the item.
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iii.

DECIDE whether that measure is :
Strongly
Agree
Undecided
Agree

iv.

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

Not
sure/don’t
know

DRAW A CIRCLE around one of the six options following the item to show the answer
you make.

For further follow up please contact:
American University in Cairo - School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
Ahmed Fathy Badawy
Mobile: 010-1640872
Due to time constraints, kindly send responses in hard copy or electronic format no later than 15
May, 2011 to:
E-mail: a_fathy@aucegypt.edu
Kindly naswer the follwoing quesitons:
 Section A : Respondant Background characteristics


Your Gender :
o Male
o Female



Your Age:
o 25-35
o 35-45
o 45-55
o 55-65
o Over 65



You experienced CCT through which of the following activities:
o
o
o
o
o
o



Donor
Implementor :– Management activities
Implementor :– Admin. & Finance activities
Field Work
Consulting
Other, please fill in the space (---------------------)

Your Title: please specify: (--------------------------------------------------------------------)
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Your role on the process : please specify (---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------)

 Section B: Program Background charcterisitcs


Countryof implementation: (-------------------------)



Area in which the CCT program is implmented
o Rural area
o Urban area



Total number of beneficiery household covered by the program (ranges)
o
o
o
o



How long the program take for implementation?
o
o
o
o



Less than half million beneficiery
A million of beneficiries
Two million benefciery
More than three million beneficiery

1-3 years
4-6 years
More than 6 years
Other ; please specify (-------------------)

Section C: Was any of the following program eligibility criteria used?
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1.
o
o

dwelling unit size / number of rooms
Yes
No

2.

If yes, what was the criterion? Please specify (--------------)

3.
o
o

Number of people per room (crowding)
Yes
No

4.
o
o

Marital status of the household
Yes
No

5.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

If yes, select from the following
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Never married
Sparated

6.
o
o

Whther a family has children less than 18 years of age
Yes
No

7.
o
o

Whther any of the houshold head has a health burden
Yes
No

8.
o
o

Whther houshold head is working ?
Yes
No

9.
o
o

Whther there is a social security received by houshold
Yes
No

10. Was there an accessibility of the houshold to socail protection schemes
o Has access to pension schemes for the poor
o Has no access to pension schemes for the poor

11. Whther the family has child labor
o Yes
o No
12. If you have other innovative eligibility criteria, please specify (--------,----------------,---------------,----)
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Strongly
Agree

A
A-1

A-2
A-3

A-4

A-5
A-6

B
B-1

B-2

B-3

Agree

Undecided

Disagr
ee

Strongly
disagree

Not
sure/don’
t know
0

5
4
3
2
1
Section One :
Social Workers
Which of the following measures do you agree would help social workers improve their
ability to screen families?
More detailed
guidelines on
eligibility
More training for
social workers
Detailed manuals
that social workers
can follow
More briefing for
beneficiaries on
eligibility
More supervision to
catch errors
Revisiting families
every 3 months to
confirm eligibility
Which of the following measures do you agree would improve the ability to determine
eligible families?
The civil society
organizations to
share in setting the
design of program
eligibility
To provide
participants with
more information
and training so that
eligibility criteria are
clearly understood
by applicants
Use technology to
match the data
provided by the
participant families
to official
government
databases more
quickly and
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B-4

B-5

B-6

B-7

C
C-1

C-2

thoroughly.
Introduce more
verification
measures as the
program expands, to
be prevent families
from presenting
inaccurate
information to gain
access to benefits
Communicate the
program requirement
to poor families to
reduce the instances
of poor families who
are eligible but
excluded because
they do not
understand what
information to
present
Include incentives to
social workers who
make efforts to
prevent fraud, or
corruption in the
program
Take measures to
avoid incorrect
eligibility
determinations that
diverge from the
program rules
Which of the following measures do you agree it would improve families’ compliance to
the program conditionality?
Provide informative
sessions to poor
families on
compliance to
encourage them to
meet the
requirements
Avoid any
ambiguity in the
conditionality
criteria to make it
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C-3

C-4

C-5

C-6

C-7

C-8

C-9

easy for families to
comply to the
conditionality
Conduct regular
visits by social
workers to facilitate
and encourage
participating
families to comply
Recertify family
eligibility to
determine if families
remain eligible and
to avoid fraudulent
actions
Provide a range of
penalties for families
who are not in
compliance, begin
by warnings up to
termination from the
program
Increase checks to
reduce fraud by
claimants in
compliance
Analyze the causes
of dropout rates after
registration and
determine why it is
not attractive to
some families to
comply to the
program
requirements
Develop a complaint
system to resolve
beneficiary problems
with program
administration
Improve
Government interdepartmental cooperation to enhance
the compliance
verification
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D
D-1

D-2

D-3

D-4

D-5

D-6

D-7

D-8

procedures
Which of the following measures do you agree would improve the CCT program
procedures for making payments to participants who comply with the conditionality?
Ensure there is
transparency in the
payment process to
fight corruption
Delink cash
payments from
government and
program social staff
Make direct
payment to
beneficiaries bank
accounts
Use national IDbitaqua in verifying
payment process to
match data on
beneficiaries and
improve detection of
wrong payments
Using IT solutions
(such as ATM cards)
in the payment
process to reduces
opportunities for
theft or diversion
Impose criminal
penalties for fraud
such as payment to
ghost beneficiaries
Monitor uncollected
payments to gain
information on
whether controls and
systems are working
Audit accounts at the
program level
audited by an
external audit
institution

What are other innovative methods you suggested to improve the program implementation
in Egypt? Please specify
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Appendix 3_ Participants Job titles

Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can
Constitute a good implementation controls?

Your Job Title
Response
Count
47

1 of 3

answered question

47

skipped question

7

Page 2, Q4. Your Job Title

1

Manager of Beneficiaries an Money Transfers

May 27, 2011 3:09 AM

2

Monitoring and Evaluation Manager

May 25, 2011 8:10 PM

3

Policy Specialist

May 24, 2011 10:48 PM

4

Program Coordinator

May 24, 2011 11:28 AM

5

Associate Professor at the A.U.C. and Cairo University

May 22, 2011 3:56 PM

6

Professor

May 22, 2011 2:33 PM

7

Former Director Of Operations of Solidarity Program, Health Sector Consultant,
Social Cabinet Of Dominican Republi

May 21, 2011 1:21 AM

8

Coordinadora Unidad de Promoción y Desarrollo Social

May 20, 2011 11:27 PM

9

Senior economist

May 20, 2011 6:53 PM

10

Assistant Professor

May 20, 2011 5:00 PM

11

International consultant

May 19, 2011 4:51 PM

12

Technical Director of the Social Policies Cabinet, Dominican Republic.

May 19, 2011 4:45 PM

13

Senior Research Fellow

May 19, 2011 9:54 AM

14

researcher

May 18, 2011 10:18 PM

15

Professor

May 18, 2011 8:33 PM

16

Social Protection Specialist

May 18, 2011 8:20 PM

17

Prof

May 18, 2011 11:47 AM

18

Social Protection Specialist

May 18, 2011 11:44 AM

19

Advisor

May 18, 2011 10:35 AM

20

Researcher

May 18, 2011 10:13 AM

21

Professor

May 18, 2011 7:47 AM

22

Professor of Economcis

May 18, 2011 6:56 AM

23

Professor

May 18, 2011 2:58 AM

24

General Coordinator

May 18, 2011 12:01 AM

25

Sector Manager (currently -- not when advising on CCT)

May 17, 2011 6:07 AM

26

Monitoring and Evaluation Officer

May 17, 2011 5:29 AM

27

assistant professor

May 17, 2011 1:22 AM

28

Senior Researcher

May 17, 2011 12:25 AM

2 of 3

Page 2, Q4. Your Job Title

29

Consultant

May 16, 2011 7:33 PM

30

Senior Researcher

May 16, 2011 7:28 PM

31

Professor Emeritus

May 16, 2011 11:00 AM

32

Social Policy Specialist

May 16, 2011 10:08 AM

33

General Director Programming and Budget, Ministry of Finance. Treasurer of
Mexico, Ministry of Finance. Consultant.

May 15, 2011 9:46 PM

34

Researcher

May 15, 2011 11:14 AM

35

Executive Director

May 14, 2011 5:47 AM

36

Director of Evaluation of Oportunidades in Mexico

May 13, 2011 10:17 PM

37

Senior Consultant, Halcrow Group Ltd, London UK

May 13, 2011 7:47 PM

38

Economist

May 13, 2011 6:00 PM

39

Senior Economist

May 13, 2011 5:54 PM

40

Associate Professor

May 13, 2011 12:34 PM

41

Economist

May 13, 2011 2:43 AM

42

Project Manager

May 13, 2011 1:35 AM

43

Coordinator - Strategic Addressing Unit

May 12, 2011 11:59 PM

44

Researcher

May 12, 2011 6:56 PM

45

Director

May 12, 2011 9:17 AM

46

Chief Economist

May 12, 2011 3:58 AM

47

President, Social Assessment, LLC

May 12, 2011 2:27 AM

3 of 3

Appendix 4_ Participant Role in CCT program

Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can
Constitute a good implementation controls?

Your role on the CCT prograam
Response
Count
46

1 of 4

answered question

46

skipped question

8

Page 2, Q5. Your role on the CCT prograam

1

Adminsitration of program beneficiaries an money transfers, administration of
information technologies (IT)

May 27, 2011 3:09 AM

2

Follow the actions and the result indicators

May 25, 2011 8:10 PM

3

External researcher

May 24, 2011 10:48 PM

4

The principal responsibility is to prepare the field logistics for the research
projects conducted by SRC, including participation in the design of interview
schedules, supervision of data collection, and data processing on numerous
projects, in the last three years he is working as a coordinator for the conditional
cash transfer program (CCT) in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Solidarity
in three different governorates (Cairo, Assuit, Sohag).

May 24, 2011 11:28 AM

5

Developing the elegibility criteria

May 22, 2011 3:56 PM

6

Design, monitoring, and evaluation

May 22, 2011 2:33 PM

7

Former Director Of Operations of Solidarity Program, Health Sector Consultant,
Social Cabinet Of Dominican Republi

May 21, 2011 1:21 AM

8

Coordinadora

May 20, 2011 11:27 PM

9

evaluator

May 20, 2011 6:53 PM

10

none

May 20, 2011 5:00 PM

11

Research, analyzing lessons learned

May 19, 2011 4:51 PM

12

The Social Policies Cabinet coordinates the formulation and implementation,
monitoring, follow up and evaluation of all social programs in the DR, including
our CCT Program, Solidaridad.

May 19, 2011 4:45 PM

13

question is unclear

May 19, 2011 9:54 AM

14

research activities

May 18, 2011 10:18 PM

15

I evaluated a CCT program in Honduras

May 18, 2011 8:33 PM

16

Advise Governments on design and implementation of Social Cash Transfer
Programmes

May 18, 2011 8:20 PM

17

academic analysis

May 18, 2011 11:47 AM

18

Costing and projection

May 18, 2011 11:44 AM

19

Statistical analyse

May 18, 2011 10:35 AM

20

Desk Study

May 18, 2011 10:13 AM

21

evaluator

May 18, 2011 7:47 AM

22

Evaluated effects of CCT programs

May 18, 2011 6:56 AM

23

Evaluator

May 18, 2011 2:58 AM

2 of 4

Page 2, Q5. Your role on the CCT prograam

24

I was part of the designing group of the program, performing research on the
amount of transfers, the mechanism to identify families in poverty. Then I was in
charge of operational planning and evaluation and eventually was the General
Coordinator in charge of directing the program as a whole

May 18, 2011 12:01 AM

25

Technical partner / advisor to program from donor agency, partnering with
Ministry that was operating program (we were financing & providing TA)

May 17, 2011 6:07 AM

26

•Consolidates and prepares Quarterly, Semestral and Annual Regional
Accomplishment Report •Prepare draft Regional Annual Thrusts and Priorities
based on the National thrusts and Priorities •Provides technical support in the
preparation of the Regional Work and Financial Plan •Provides technical
support in the implementation/conduct of Spot Checks, Impact Evaluation and
other research activities •Conduct field monitoring as required by the Regional
director •Submits periodic and special reports as needed •Recommends
policies and/or strategies pertaining to planning, monitoring and evaluation, and
research as needed •Assist in the conduct of Regional PREW •Focal person
in updating and maintaining the Regional Internal Monitoring System

May 17, 2011 5:29 AM

27

researcher

May 17, 2011 1:22 AM

28

Project manager

May 16, 2011 7:33 PM

29

Directed an evaluation project

May 16, 2011 7:28 PM

30

What process? I have participated in a cross-country survey on the impact of
cash transfers on wellbeing and development in poor households

May 16, 2011 11:00 AM

31

manager of the project " Assessment of effectiveness of cash assistance
scheme in Albania"

May 16, 2011 10:08 AM

32

Participation in the design and implementation strategy of CCTs; as well as in
the more general poverty alleviation strategy these programs should be part of,
for Mexico in a very significant role. For other countries as consultant. In
Mexico, a very Evaluation. Consultant for different countries and international
organizations.

May 15, 2011 9:46 PM

33

assessment

May 15, 2011 11:14 AM

34

User

May 14, 2011 5:47 AM

35

Coordinating the impact evaluation from within the CCT program in Mexico's
Oportunidades

May 13, 2011 10:17 PM

36

Reviews if social protection programmes in Asia and the Caribbean

May 13, 2011 7:47 PM

37

Project officer

May 13, 2011 6:00 PM

38

Designed the CCT system, developed the targeting system, supervised
implementation & national rollout

May 13, 2011 5:54 PM

39

Impact evaluation

May 13, 2011 12:34 PM

40

Project Design

May 13, 2011 2:43 AM

41

Coordinate project implementation

May 13, 2011 1:35 AM

3 of 4

Page 2, Q5. Your role on the CCT prograam

42

Monitoring and Evaluation, Finances Planing, Information System, Citizens
Advice, (complaints, claims, news), Payment Processing

May 12, 2011 11:59 PM

43

Conducting impact evaluation

May 12, 2011 6:56 PM

44

Advised World Bank and other governments on cash transfer program design

May 12, 2011 9:17 AM

45

Research

May 12, 2011 3:58 AM

46

research and coordination

May 12, 2011 2:27 AM
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Appendix 5_ Summary_of_CCT_programs_implemented_globally

Summary of CCt programs implemented globally
Ref.#

Prog.Name

1

Bolsa Familia

Country

Brazil

Year
launched
Oct.2003

# of
beneficiaries in
latest year

Total budget

reach 11.4 million
families by 2006

Budget: R$10.4
billion ($5
billion) in 2005
(0.36% of GDP)

Implementing
org.
Government
through
decentralized
federation

Administrative
cost: 4% of
program
budget

1

Chile Solidario

Chile

May.2002

225,000

Budget: 0.3% of
social
protection
spending
(0.08% of GDP;
2005)
Administrative
cost: 20% of
program costs,
half of that
being the cost
of the social
worker
accompaniment

1

Oportunidades

Mexico

2002

By 2004, 5 million

In 2002 around
Mex$18 billion
(US$1.8 billion)

Prog.conditionality

Stipend per family

 85 % school
attendance for
school age children

R$50 ($42 ppp)/ moth
each+ every additionl
child , up to three, or
pregnant women R$15
($13ppp) : therefore
R$95 ($ 91 ppp) is the
highest amount
transferred to a family

 Update
immunization cards
for children up to
six years old
 Regular visits to
health center for
breast feeding or
pregnant women

National
Government
through social
solidarity
investment fund
in partnership
with
municipilalities

Selection criteria
based on a score
derived from Ficha
CAS-2 , which
generates a
multidimensionsl
ranking index; the
highr the score , the
worse is the situation
of families

If the family meets the
target after one year; it’s
automatically excluded
from the program. If not
the value of transfer
decreases after the first
year and over the first
six months started with
10,500 pesos ($ 33ppp)
and for the last six
months ends by 3,716
pesos ($12ppp)

Government

Selection of
beneficiary follows
three stages:

The transfer has three
basic components two of
which are conditional
and third one is
unconditional:

 Municipilities are
chosen according
to an index of
marginality
1

 Households within

 Unconditional transfer
250 pesos ($ 32 ppp)
per elderly adult

(Institute of Applied Economic Research, IPEA, 2007)``
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the municipilities
selected according
to a sociodemographic study
 Feedback received
from communities
in order to check
eligibility

 Conditional food
support by attending
training session on
nutrition and health
equal to 189 pesos ($
24 ppp)
 Conditional
scholarship to
children in grades
between 3 to 12 by
attending schools and
health centers with
amounts ranged
between 120 pesos ($
15 ppp) to 760 pesos
($ 98 ppp)
1,855 pesos ($141) is the
maximum amount that
household can obtain

2

Juntos

Peru

2005

June 2008 453,823

Budget: S/. 300
million ($100
million) in 2006
(0.11% of GDP)

PeruGovernmental
institutions

Health: Regular
health visits for
pregnant women
and for children
less than 5 years
old

S/.100 ($33) per month
for 4 years

Education: School
attendance of at
least 85% for
children aged 6–
14 who have not
completed
elementary
education
Other:
Participation in
the Mi Nombre
(My Name)
program by all
families with
children who lack
birth certificates
and/or are older
than 18 years and
have no
2

(The World Bank , 2011)
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identification card
Familias en
Acción

Colombia

2001

1.7 million
households by end
of 2007

Budget: $200
per month
(0.2% of GDP;
2007)
Administrative
cost: 5.0% of
program
budget (1.0% is
for materials
related to
verification of
compliance),
plus 3.4% in
banking
commissions

Pantawid
Pamilyang
Pilipino
Program (4
P’s)

3

3

Piloting CCT in
Egypt

Philippines

Egypt

2008

2008 in Ain El
Serra & should
start in Upper
Egypt by 2011

Total
beneficiaries:
approx. 380,000
households - Poor
households in 140
of the poorest
municipalities and
10 cities

approximately
46,069 families
were deemed
eligible for
application

US$ 471 million
over 5 year
period (20092013)

The cost of this
program if
applied in all
villages and
their appended
rural units,
would cost
1888 million

Gov.Presidential
Agency for
Social Action
and
International
Cooperation,
local program
offices

Meet the growth
control and
development
checkups
scheduled every 2
months for
children aged 0–1,
3 times a year for
children up to 2
years, and 2 times
a year thereafter
up to 7 years
At least 80%
school attendance
in a 2-month
cycle (maximum
of 8 unjustified
absences in a 2month period)

Department of
Social Welfare
and
Development
acting as
executing
agency, in
partnership
with
Departments of
Health and
Education

Children and
pregnant women
attend health
centers and posts
to get regular
preventive health
check ups and
immunizations,
according to the
Department of
Health’s protocol

Government:
financed by the
MOSS and the
research
expenses
activities by the
Social Research
Center (SRC)

 Birth registration

Children enroll in
schools and
attend over 85%
of school classes

Agree to receive a
monthly social
worker visit and
cooperate

Education subsidy: in
elementary school,
Col$15,000 per month
(approximately $8) for
each minor attending
grades 2–5in high school,
Col$25,000–60,000 per
month (approximately
$14–33) per minor
attending grades 6–11
Health subsidy:
Col$50,000 per month
(approximately $3,028)
per family with members
less than 7 years

Health transfer currently
set at PhP 500 (US$11)
per household per month
(for a period of 12
months/year) regardless
of the number of
children
Education transfer is of
PhP 300 (US$7) per
month (for a period of 10
months/year), up to a
maximum of 3 children

The amount suggested is
244 EGP for each family

Children at age 5-

(Hania, 2010)
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EGP yearly

grants from
UNICEF and
another grant
for MOSS by
UNDP

6 must enroll in
primary school
Children between
ages 6 and 15 who
are enrolled in
school must
attend 85% of
school days each
month
Children who
never enrolled
but are too old to
start primary
school – enroll in
remedial
education
Obtain ration
card, with help of
social worker
All members of
the family to
attend preventive
health visits
according to
MOHP protocol,
including child
growth
monitoring,
immunizations
and deworming
Mothers to attend
ANC, PNC and
deliver in health
facilities
according to
MOHP protocol
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Appendix 6- Summary of respondents to Deterrence measures in CCT

Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good
implementation controls?

1.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to discourage error, fraud, and corruption in CCT
programs?
Was used and

Was used and

Was used with

Was used but

was Highly

Somewhat

low level of

not effective at

effective

effective

effectiveness

all

9.1% (3)

54.5% (18)

15.2% (5)

3.0% (1)

0.0% (0)

18.2% (6)

33

51.5% (17)

3.0% (1)

15.2% (5)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

30.3% (10)

33

33.3% (11)

15.2% (5)

6.1% (2)

3.0% (1)

0.0% (0)

42.4% (14)

33

33.3% (11)

6.1% (2)

21.2% (7)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

39.4% (13)

33

9.1% (3)

57.6% (19)

15.2% (5)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

18.2% (6)

33

Not used

Not sure/don’t

Response

know

Count

Training staff to ensure they have
a clear understanding of what
constitutes error, fraud, and
corruption
Putting in place strong criminal
penalties for fraudulent actions by
program staff or beneficiaries
Strengthening laws and regulations
that govern punishment for fraud or
corruption by beneficiaries
Strengthening laws and regulations
that govern punishment for fraud or
corruption by program officials
Establish public awareness
campaigns to ensure beneficiaries
and community members
understand how the program will
deter fraud and corruption
Use administrative penalties or

1 of 2

formal cautions directed to clients
who provide incorrect compliance

27.3% (9)

21.2% (7)

30.3% (10)

0.0% (0)

3.0% (1)

18.2% (6)

33

39.4% (13)

9.1% (3)

15.2% (5)

0.0% (0)

3.0% (1)

33.3% (11)

33

information.
Use administrative penalties or
formal cautions directed to school
officials who provide incorrect
compliance

2 of 2

answered question

33

skipped question

21

Appendix 7- Summary of respondents to Prevention measures at CCT eligibility stage

Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good
implementation controls?

2.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to prevent error, fraud, and corruption at the
eligibility stage?
Was used and

Was used and

Was used with

Was used but

was Highly

Somewhat

low level of

not effective at

effective

effective

effectiveness

all

12.1% (4)

72.7% (24)

3.0% (1)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

12.1% (4)

33

12.1% (4)

66.7% (22)

12.1% (4)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

9.1% (3)

33

27.3% (9)

24.2% (8)

24.2% (8)

9.1% (3)

0.0% (0)

15.2% (5)

33

12.1% (4)

54.5% (18)

9.1% (3)

6.1% (2)

0.0% (0)

18.2% (6)

33

15.2% (5)

48.5% (16)

15.2% (5)

3.0% (1)

0.0% (0)

18.2% (6)

33

Not used

Design a stage of data collection
process to identify cases
Begin with a mapping of the
community
Involvement of civil society
organizations in the program design

Not sure/don’t

Response

know

Count

Use of IT systems in the
verification of proves of eligibility
against national databases
Training for program staff on
mechanisms to prevent error,
fraud, and corruption

1 of 1

answered question

33

skipped question

21

Appendix 8-Summary of respondents to Detection measures at CCT eligibility stage

Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good
implementation controls?

3.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to detect error, fraud, and corruption at the eligibility
stage?
Was used and

Was used and

Was used with

Was used but

was Highly

Somewhat

low level of

not effective at

effective

effective

effectiveness

all

27.3% (9)

39.4% (13)

12.1% (4)

3.0% (1)

0.0% (0)

18.2% (6)

33

33.3% (11)

30.3% (10)

9.1% (3)

3.0% (1)

3.0% (1)

21.2% (7)

33

27.3% (9)

39.4% (13)

15.2% (5)

3.0% (1)

0.0% (0)

15.2% (5)

33

15.2% (5)

45.5% (15)

12.1% (4)

3.0% (1)

0.0% (0)

24.2% (8)

33

Not used

Not sure/don’t

Response

know

Count

Systems to facilitate data matching
of the participant families across
different data sources.
To focus eligibility checks on highrisk groups
Recertify eligibility periodically to
detect fraudulent actions
Make thorough cross-checks of
registries to detect inconsistencies.

1 of 1

answered question

33

skipped question

21

Appendix 9- Summary of respondents to Prevention measures at CCT compliance stage

Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good
implementation controls?

1.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to prevent error, fraud, and corruption at the
compliance stage?
Was used and

Was used and

Was used with

Was used but

was Highly

Somewhat

low level of

not effective at

effective

effective

effectiveness

all

21.9% (7)

25.0% (8)

21.9% (7)

3.1% (1)

3.1% (1)

25.0% (8)

32

15.6% (5)

46.9% (15)

18.8% (6)

3.1% (1)

0.0% (0)

15.6% (5)

32

40.6% (13)

18.8% (6)

9.4% (3)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

31.3% (10)

32

37.5% (12)

12.5% (4)

12.5% (4)

3.1% (1)

0.0% (0)

34.4% (11)

32

40.6% (13)

12.5% (4)

9.4% (3)

6.3% (2)

0.0% (0)

31.3% (10)

32

Not used

Allocation of Government interdepartmental responsibilities

Not sure/don’t

Response

know

Count

Determine the nature of the
problems facing families and
support the family
Warning or punishing of families
that bribe program officials to
falsely confirm compliance with
program conditionality
Warning and punishing school
officials who provide wrong
compliance verification.
Warning and punishing health
workers who provide wrong
compliance verification

1 of 1

answered question

32

skipped question

22

Appendix 10-Summary of respondents to Detection measures at CCT compliance stage

Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good
implementation controls?

2.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to detect error, fraud, and corruption at the
compliance stage?
Was used and

Was used and

Was used with

Was used but

was Highly

Somewhat

low level of

not effective at

effective

effective

effectiveness

all

15.6% (5)

53.1% (17)

15.6% (5)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

15.6% (5)

32

15.6% (5)

46.9% (15)

18.8% (6)

3.1% (1)

0.0% (0)

15.6% (5)

32

12.5% (4)

53.1% (17)

12.5% (4)

3.1% (1)

0.0% (0)

18.8% (6)

32

25.0% (8)

40.6% (13)

12.5% (4)

6.3% (2)

0.0% (0)

15.6% (5)

32

9.4% (3)

50.0% (16)

28.1% (9)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

12.5% (4)

32

31.3% (10)

46.9% (15)

6.3% (2)

0.0% (0)

3.1% (1)

12.5% (4)

32

28.1% (9)

34.4% (11)

12.5% (4)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

25.0% (8)

32

Not used

Regular visits to schools to monitor
children school attendance

Not sure/don’t

Response

know

Count

Regular visits to healthcare centers
to monitor children & family health
checkup records
Streamline of eligibility
determination and related program
rules to reduce level of ambiguity
Establish hotlines to receive
complaints of families on noncompliance issues
If families refuse to comply with
conditions, a family will be
excluded from the program
Make regular visits by social
workers to facilitate and encourage
family compliance
Sample selections of cases for
independent monitoring of

1 of 2

outcomes to detect problems
Cross-check of compliance from
supplier of service

15.6% (5)

34.4% (11)

15.6% (5)

2 of 2

6.3% (2)

0.0% (0)

28.1% (9)

32

answered question

32

skipped question

22

Appendix 11- Summary of respondents to Prevention measures at CCT Cash Disbursing stage

Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good
implementation controls?

1.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to prevent error, fraud, and corruption at the cash
disbursement stage?
Was used and

Was used and

Was used with

Was used but

was Highly

Somewhat

low level of

not effective at

effective

effective

effectiveness

all

21.9% (7)

65.6% (21)

6.3% (2)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

6.3% (2)

32

40.6% (13)

40.6% (13)

6.3% (2)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

12.5% (4)

32

28.1% (9)

46.9% (15)

9.4% (3)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

15.6% (5)

32

Not used

Not sure/don’t

Response

know

Count

Direct payment to program
beneficiaries through direct bank
deposits
Regular checks by program
administration on compliance
before cash disbursing, rather than
later in the process
De-link cash payments from
government and program staff

1 of 1

answered question

32

skipped question

22

Appendix 12- Summary of respondents to Detection measures at CCT Cash Disbursing stage

Conditional Cash Transfer in Egypt: What Can Constitute a good
implementation controls?

2.In your experience, which of the following measures have been used to detect error, fraud, and corruption at the cash
disbursement stage? ?
Was used and

Was used and

Was used with

Was used but

was Highly

Somewhat

low level of

not effective at

effective

effective

effectiveness

all

34.4% (11)

25.0% (8)

12.5% (4)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

28.1% (9)

32

46.9% (15)

12.5% (4)

9.4% (3)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

31.3% (10)

32

28.1% (9)

31.3% (10)

12.5% (4)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

28.1% (9)

32

12.5% (4)

56.3% (18)

6.3% (2)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

25.0% (8)

32

25.0% (8)

43.8% (14)

3.1% (1)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

28.1% (9)

32

25.0% (8)

40.6% (13)

6.3% (2)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

28.1% (9)

32

25.0% (8)

37.5% (12)

3.1% (1)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

34.4% (11)

32

Not used

Review of benefit claims on
randomly, or risk basis
Monitor reports of ATM cards lost or
stolen as a signal of possible fraud

Not sure/don’t

Response

know

Count

Collaborate to monitor cash flow by
involving national and external audit
units
Use national IDs in verifying the
payment process to match data of
beneficiaries and improve detection
efforts
Reconcile payment transfers with
actual payments on a regular basis
Have national accounts audited by
an external audit institution
Monitor uncollected payments to
gain information on the quality of
controls and validate CCT cash
payments

1 of 2

2 of 2

answered question

32

skipped question

22

